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ROADBLOCKS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE: 
REFORMING ETHICAL RULES TO MEET THE SPECIAL NEEDS 
OF LOW-INCOME CLIENTS 
LOUIS S. RULLI 
INTRODUCTION 
The fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright
1
 sparked a robust conversation about 
our nation’s justice system and the difficult barriers that ordinary citizens confront in seeking 
access to justice.
2
 A right to counsel for the accused has made our criminal courtrooms fairer, as 
Justice Hugo Black envisioned when he authored the Supreme Court’s unanimous opinion in 
Gideon and recited Justice Sutherland’s prophetic words, “The right to be heard would be, in 
many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”
3
 But the true 
promise of Gideon remains unrealized. We have yet to muster the political will and financial 
resources for indigent defense representation that are needed to balance the scales of justice.
4
 
Gideon’s anniversary has also focused needed attention on our civil courtrooms. The 
decline in financial support for civil legal assistance to the poor and years of economic recession 
have only deepened the nation’s justice gap, with millions of vulnerable residents having to stand 
alone in court when attempting to protect their most important interests.
5
 The organized bar, in 
collaboration with legal aid organizations, has provided a consistent voice for expanding access to 
justice by raising public awareness of this crisis and mounting strong efforts to increase public 
funding for civil legal assistance, obtain greater pro bono legal assistance, and promote a right to 
                                                                
 Practice Professor of Law and Director of Clinical Programs, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I would like to 
express my sincere gratitude and thanks to Dustin Marlan (L’12) and Thomas Wheeler (L’15), two very talented members 
of the Penn Law community, who provided such able research assistance and feedback in the preparation of this Article. 
1  372 U.S. 335, 339-42 (1963) (holding that individuals accused of a crime have a right to legal assistance 
and that state courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants who cannot afford counsel). 
2  Yale Law Journal’s 2013 symposium focused on the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon and included articles 
on the current status of Gideon, its effects, and potential changes. See generally Symposium, The Gideon Effect: Rights, 
Justice, and Lawyers Fifty Years After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2106 (2013). 
3  Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)). 
4  Public defense must provide effective representation in order to pass the Gideon standard of counsel. This 
burden is not met when systematic flaws due to an inadequate budget deprive indigent criminal defendants of Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1131 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 
2013) (“Mere appointment of counsel to represent an indigent defendant is not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment’s 
promise of the assistance of counsel.”); see also id. at 1137 (“The notes of freedom and liberty that emerged from 
Gideon’s trumpet a half a century ago cannot survive if that trumpet is muted and dented by harsh fiscal measures that 
reduce the promise to a hollow shell of a hallowed right.”). Further, public defenders need to be able to meet their ethical 
burdens on each case individually rather than fail to meet it on any when overburdened. See Pub. Defender, Eleventh 
Judicial Circuit of Fla. v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 281-82 (Fla. 2013) (holding that the overworked public defender’s office 
may withdraw from assigned cases and reject new ones where crippling caseloads threaten the ability of defenders to meet 
ethical obligations). 
5  See infra notes 10-29 and accompanying text. 
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counsel in civil matters involving basic human needs. The judiciary has also increasingly become 
a leader and innovator in these efforts. Many prominent state court judges have assumed 
leadership roles in advocating for increased funding for legal aid, while also developing pilot 
programs and implementing changes in court rules that promise to expand access to legal help.
6
 
Rapid change defines the current legal environment, and bold and aggressive measures are needed 
to make headway at ameliorating the justice gap.
7
 
While many states have modified court rules to increase funding for civil legal assistance 
and expand pro bono legal assistance to the poor, there have been relatively few changes to the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct over the past fifteen years aimed at promoting access to 
justice for those who are unable to afford counsel.
8
 The Model Rules have failed to keep pace 
with the changing ways in which lawyers are struggling to provide legal help to the poor. Our 
profession’s ethical rules remain largely situated in a traditional lawyering paradigm where 
lawyers meet with paying clients in the comfort of their offices and have ample time and 
resources to explore the full range of client needs. This model assumes that clients have the 
financial means and freedom of choice to select lawyers who best meet their needs. Based upon 
this paradigm, the Model Rules impose reasonable constraints on lawyering activities designed to 
prevent lawyer overreaching and protect the public in the delivery of for-profit services. The 
Model Rules purposely employ vagueness and ambiguity to give lawyers flexibility in exercising 
professional judgment in situations where context often makes an important difference.
9
 
Today, however, low-income individuals infrequently encounter the traditional paradigm 
when they need legal help. Rather, in their non-traditional lawyering world, legal help is 
                                                                
6  See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., Rule Change Could Ease ‘Justice Gap’ For the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
3, 2013, at A22 (detailing rule changes by the New York chief judge to increase the availability of lawyers by allowing 
out-of-state non-licensed corporate lawyers to engage in pro bono work); Press Release, Supreme Court of Ill., Chief 
Justice Kilbride and the Illinois Supreme Court Announce New Initiative to Ease Access to Courts 2 (June 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.state.il.us/court/media/PressRel/2012/061312.pdf (discussing such initiatives as creating 
standardized forms and utilizing law students, as well as the similar commissions created in 26 other states); Judge Rizzo 
on White House Panel, PHILA. BAR REP. Jan. 2011, at 8, available at http://www.philabar.org/WebObjects/ 
PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Jan_2011.pdf (discussing Philadelphia’s widely 
acclaimed Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Diversion Pilot Program launched by Judge Annette Rizzo of the 
Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas). 
7  See Sheldon Krantz, Aggressive Action – Not Tinkering – Is Required to Resolve the Access to Justice 
Crisis, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 6, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/legalrebels/article/aggressive_action--
not_tinkering--is_required_access_to_justice/ (discussing current shortcomings in the legal profession’s approach to 
solving the justice gap and offering several solutions). 
8  See generally LEGAL SERVS. CORP., REPORT OF THE PRO BONO TASK FORCE (2012), 
http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/lscgov4/PBTF_%20Report_FINAL.pdf (noting that changes in the rules of 
areas such as bar admission, student practice, and emeritus lawyers could significantly increase pro bono access). The 
Model Rules have been amended on nine separate occasions since February 2002 with many of the changes directed to 
multijurisdictional practice, corporate responsibility, client protection, conflicts of interest, and technology and global 
legal practice developments. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 4-6 (2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/final_mjp_rpt_121702_2.authcheckdam.pdf (summarizing adopted recommendations to amend 
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to better address the legal work of lawyers in jurisdictions in which they are not 
admitted to practice law). There have been several important changes affecting access to justice, largely taken from the 
report of the Ethics 2000 Commission, and these are discussed more fully in this Article. 
9  See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
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increasingly delivered by agencies of last resort at a high volume and in community settings or 
courtroom corridors quite distant from the comfort of well-resourced law firm offices. It is in 
these non-traditional settings that the profession has an obligation to ask: Do the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct promote or hinder access to justice? Have the Model Rules kept pace with a 
rapidly changing legal environment that does not often resemble the traditional lawyering 
paradigm upon which so many of our ethical rules are squarely based? 
This Article contends that the Model Rules have not kept pace with the demands of the 
justice gap. The Model Rules unnecessarily constrain public interest and pro bono lawyers based 
upon assumptions grounded in a traditional, for-profit paradigm that have little to do with the 
delivery of short-term legal services in a high-volume, non-profit world. Ambiguity and 
vagueness in the Model Rules that serve the needs of traditional, private sector attorneys too often 
act to chill needed help from public interest or pro bono lawyers who are uncertain whether their 
well-intended efforts will be regarded as professional misconduct. 
This Article also describes how the current Model Rules impair the ability of lawyers to 
provide discrete services to unrepresented individuals, extend financial assistance to indigent 
clients, and conclude agreed-upon representation in pro bono matters. Through these examples, 
the Article illustrates the need for the Model Rules to adapt more quickly to the realities of the 
justice gap and to meet the special challenges that legal aid and volunteer lawyers face when 
helping the poor. There is a greater need than ever for the appointment of a high level, blue ribbon 
ethics commission, populated generously by leaders of legal aid and pro bono organizations and 
of state courts that serve the poor, to conduct a comprehensive review of the Model Rules viewed 
through the lens of a non-traditional lawyering paradigm. This commission should be charged 
with the goal of promoting access to justice through ethical lawyering. 
The Justice Gap in an Inverted Funding Environment 
The funding mechanism for civil justice functions exactly the opposite of how it should. 
Resources for civil justice evaporate when they are needed most. As the need for free legal help 
explodes in economically distressed times, the very funding sources designed to support civil 
legal assistance are almost certain to decline. Currently, there is unprecedented need for free legal 
help, as poverty rates are near their highest levels in fifty years.
10
 The poor are struggling to hold 
on to their homes and incomes, as we see record rates of mortgage foreclosures and increased 
predatory lending practices only growing more nefarious with the passage of time. As 
unemployment and poverty rates have increased,
11
 public resources for civil legal assistance have 
declined. 
Federal funding for civil legal aid has once again become a predictable victim of federal 
budget cuts, with the total appropriations from Congress dropping to pre-1980 levels.
12
 Interest on 
                                                                
10  Hope Yen, U.S. Poverty on Track to Rise to Highest Since 1960s, HUFFINGTON POST (July 22, 2012, 5:47 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/22/us-poverty-level-1960s_n_1692744.html. 
11  See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 13 fig. 4 (2013), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2013pubs/p60-245.pdf (showing a recent rise in poverty rate); see also Household Data, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat01.pdf (showing the percent of the labor force unemployed from 1943 to 2013). 
12  See Funding History, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/congress/funding/funding-history (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2014) (documenting the historical amount of Legal Services Corporation funding and showing that 2013 
funding was less than half the 1980 funding level when adjusted for inflation). 
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Lawyer Trust Accounts (“IOLTA”) funding, the nation’s second largest funding source for civil 
legal assistance to the poor, has plummeted with near-zero interest rates and declining business 
activity.
13
 Supplemental funding streams adopted in some states, such as surcharges on court 
filings, have also declined as the number of new court filings has fallen with decreased business 
activity.
14
 During tough economic times, when the poor need their lawyers most, the funding 
streams that make free legal assistance possible decline markedly, leaving behind a serious justice 
gap that undermines our civil justice system.
15
 
We spend less on civil legal aid during times of economic distress, even though research 
has shown that legal needs rise sharply and that having a lawyer makes a real difference for the 
poor.
16
 With legal help, low-income families have a much better chance of saving their homes, 
obtaining needed public benefits, and escaping intimate partner violence.
17
 Research studies 
predictably tie evidence of a lawyer’s value to enhanced litigation outcomes.
18
 Litigation 
outcomes alone, however, cannot capture the non-quantitative benefits derived from having a 
lawyer. Most litigants are better able to accept unfavorable results and maintain confidence in the 
integrity of the justice system when they believe the process was fair and their voices were 
                                                                
13  See Terry Carter, IOLTA Programs Find New Funding to Support Legal Services, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 1, 
2013, 1:29 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/iolta_programs_find_new_funding_to_support_ 
legal_services/ (discussing the significant decrease in IOLTA funding due to a zero percentage interest rate and the 
inadequacy of potential changes to the system). 
14  See PA. INTEREST ON LAWYERS TRUST ACCOUNT BD., IOLTA ANNUAL REPORT 2012, at 22 (2012), 
available at http://www.paiolta.org/operations/2012-IOLTA.pdf; id. at 31-32 (detailing the importance of new 
administrative fees for funding IOLTA programs). 
15  The problem of reverse order funding is perhaps most apparent in the case of IOLTA funding, where 
during prosperous economic times business activity increases and interest rates rise, producing much higher IOLTA 
revenues to support civil legal assistance. But when economic conditions falter, IOLTA funds fall dramatically just as 
legal need is at its highest. The challenge for public funding is to build funding streams that grow with legitimate demand, 
rather than shrink when needed most. See Jonathan Lippman, New York’s Template to Address the Crisis in Civil Legal 
Services, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 13 (2013) (“There is a growing justice gap between the dire need for civil legal 
services and the dwindling resources available.”).  
16  See, e.g., Russell Engler, Connecting Self-Representation to Civil Gideon: What Existing Data Reveal 
About When Counsel Is Most Needed, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 37, 64-65 (2010) (“Studies of state tax appeals, Federal 
Compensation Act (‘FECA’) claims, and claims for veterans benefits all report a jump in success rates of 15% to 20% for 
represented claimants compared to unrepresented ones. Regarding welfare ‘fair hearings,’ the data is both murkier and 
dated. Two reports describe minimal or no benefit from attorney representation, while others show a sizable benefit. 
Recent data from Massachusetts falls within the 15-20% gap in success rates.”); see also BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON 
THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, THE IMPORTANCE OF REPRESENTATION IN EVICTION CASES AND HOMELESSNESS 
PREVENTION 15 (2012), available at http://www.bostonbar.org/docs/default-document-library/bba-crtc-final-3-1-12.pdf 
(finding in a randomized study in Quincy, Massachusetts that tenants with full representation “fared, on average, twice as 
well in terms of retaining possession, and almost five times as well in terms of rent waived and monetary awards.”). But 
see D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, Randomized Evaluation in Legal Assistance: What Difference Does 
Representation (Offer and Actual Use) Make?, 121 YALE L.J. 2118, 2118 (2012) (“Our randomized evaluation found that 
the offers of representation from the clinic had no statistically significant effect on the probability that unemployment 
claimants would prevail in their ‘appeals,’ but that the offers did delay proceedings by, on average, about two weeks.”). 
17  See supra note 16; Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic Violence, 
21 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 158, 167 (2003) (“Most services provided to help battered women do not impact the 
likelihood of abuse, but the provision of legal services significantly lowers the incidence of domestic violence.”). 
18  See supra note 16. 
4
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heard.
19
 We all win when litigants have confidence in the rule of law and in the fairness of our 
justice system, whether or not a given individual prevails on a particular claim or defense. 
Providing lawyers to the poor also produces significant financial benefits to states and 
local communities.
20
 Recent economic impact studies have documented that between three and 
eleven dollars are returned to states and local communities for each dollar spent on legal aid to the 
poor.
21
 
Despite tangible proof of societal benefits from the provision of civil legal assistance to 
                                                                
19  The view of the courts by self-represented litigants is based on their perception of “procedural justice” as 
being fair – meaning that they were able to tell their story, their process was without error, and they received an outcome 
based on the cumulative facts of the case. See Paula Hannaford-Agor & Nicole Mott, Research on Self-Represented 
Litigation: Preliminary Results and Methodological Considerations, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 163, 179 (2003) (“[R]esearch has 
shown people are more affected by the fairness of the process or the procedures followed to arrive at a decision. Most 
notably, Thibaut and Walker (1975) found that people were more apt to accept court decisions if they thought the court 
procedures were fair, subsequently coining the term procedural justice.”). 
20  An increasing number of empirical studies of the economic impact of legal services to the poor have 
revealed that the gains from such programs significantly outpace their costs. See generally Philadelphia Bar Association’s 
Civil Gideon Corner – Studies, PHILA. BAR ASS’N, http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/CivilGideonStudies?appNum=2 
(last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (providing links to various empirical studies on civil legal assistance). When indigent clients 
receive increased representation, it introduces savings and increased welfare to the economy, the state, and the individual. 
See, e.g., LAURA K. ABEL, NAT’L CTR. FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE AT CARDOZO LAW SCH., ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF CIVIL 
LEGAL AID 1-2 (2012), available at http://ncforaj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/final-economic-benefits-of-legal-aid-9-
5-2012.pdf (asserting that civil legal aid saves public money by reducing domestic violence, helping children leave foster 
care more quickly, reducing evictions, and protecting patients’ health); Louis S. Rulli, Money Well Spent: The Value of 
Civil Legal Assistance to the Poor, PHILA. LAW., Fall 2012 at 24, 25 (“In a report dated April 11, 2012, researchers found 
that for each dollar spent on legal aid, $11 of quantifiable economic outcomes and savings were realized for all residents 
of the Commonwealth.”) (internal quotations omitted). Beyond economics, civil legal assistance supports important 
societal values by boosting both trust in the community and accountability by government. Id. at 28 (“Perhaps the most 
important lesson about the value of civil legal assistance is that it bolsters the poor’s view of our justice system and holds 
government accountable to make sure that everyone is treated with respect and fairness. This guiding principle fosters trust 
and hope that keeps low-income families connected to mainstream society and enhances their ability to move out of 
poverty.”). 
21  See, e.g., IOWA LEGAL AID, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF IOWA LEGAL AID 1 (2013) (reporting a $6.71 
return per dollar invested in Iowa Legal Aid), available at http://www.iowalegalaid.org/files/A3ED30CF-AFFE-7431-
9310-0D521E4312AF/attachments/CF9C722F-986A-48F4-A399-D664E1837D79/economic-impact-study-1-22-13.pdf; 
KENNETH A. SMITH & ANDREA J. BREWER, RES. FOR GREAT PROGRAMS, INC., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CIVIL LEGAL AID 
ORGANIZATIONS IN VIRGINIA: CIVIL JUSTICE FOR LOW-INCOME PEOPLE PRODUCES RIPPLE EFFECTS THAT BENEFIT 
EVERY SEGMENT OF THE COMMUNITY 14 (2011), available at http://www.vplc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/VA-
Report-on-Economic-Impacts.pdf (reporting a $5.27 return per dollar invested in Virginia legal aid programs); MD. 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL LEGAL SERVICES IN MARYLAND 14 (2013), available at 
http://mdcourts.gov/mdatjc/pdfs/economicimpactofcivillegalservicesinmd201301.pdf (reporting a $190 million per year 
rise in “economic activity, cost savings, and productivity” for Maryland attributable to legal aid providers); THE 
PERRYMAN GROUP, CURRENT AND POTENTIAL ECONOMICS BENEFITS OF LEGAL AID SERVICES IN TEXAS: 2013 UPDATE 9 
(2013), available at http://www.teajf.org/news/docs/Impact-of-Legal-Aid-2013-FINAL.pdf (“For every direct dollar 
expended in the state for indigent civil legal services, the overall annual gains to the economy are found to be $7.48 in 
total spending, $3.59 in output (gross product), and $2.22 in personal income. Moreover, this activity generates 
approximately $47.5 million in yearly fiscal revenues to State and local government entities.”); Economic Impact Studies: 
An Argument for Funding, DIALOGUE (Winter 2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/ 
dialogue/ls_dial_wi12_full_issue.authcheckdam.pdf (“The savings and economic impact in New York State totaled nearly 
$1 billion representing a five to one gain in the monies spent for civil legal services.”). 
5
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the poor, the justice gap continues to grow at an alarming pace. Legal aid providers, judges, and 
bar leaders are working together to respond in bold and innovative ways to promote access to 
justice. To enhance the success of these efforts, the Conference of Chief Justices and the 
Conference of State Court Administrators have urged all states to establish blue-ribbon 
commissions dedicated to promoting access to justice.
22
 Known as Access to Justice 
Commissions, these entities bring together key stakeholders to promote access to justice and 
remove obstacles that hamper civil legal assistance to the poor.
23
 These Commissions explore 
ways to boost legal aid funding, encourage pro bono legal services, improve court access for self-
represented individuals, and consider the extension of a right to counsel to additional areas of civil 
legal assistance.
24
 Thirty-one states have already established access to justice commissions, and 
other states are actively considering doing so.
25
 Access to justice commissions operate mostly 
under the auspices of state supreme courts and usually include the active participation of state 
judges at all levels.
26
 
The increasing role of state judges, and particularly that of chief justices, in leading 
efforts to expand access to justice is making a vital difference across the nation. Chief Judge 
Jonathan Lippman of New York has championed bold initiatives that have boosted public funding 
for civil legal assistance, initiated pilot projects, and adopted new court rules requiring fifty hours 
of pro bono legal assistance as a condition of admission to the New York State bar, to name just a 
few.
27
 Chief Justices John Broderick of New Hampshire and Ronald George of California 
collaborated in an article published in the New York Times that voiced deep concern over the 
increasing number of unrepresented individuals and the need to assist courts in assuring that 
                                                                
22  See generally CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES & CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, RESOLUTION 
13: REAFFIRMING COMMITMENT TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE LEADERSHIP AND EXPRESSING APPRECIATION FOR ACCESS TO 
JUSTICE PROGRESS AND COLLABORATION (2013), available at http://ccj.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CCJ 
/Resolutions/07312013-Reaffirming-Commitment-Justice-Leadership-Expressing-ATJ-Collaboration-CCJ-COSCA.ashx 
(reaffirming the conferences’ support of access to justice programs). 
23  See generally CTR. ON COURT ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL, ACCESS BRIEF: ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
COMMISSIONS 1-5 (Jan. 2013), available at http://ncsc.contentdm.oclc.org/utils/getfile/collection/accessfair/id/271 
(describing different issues and potential solutions for current problems in access to justice). 
24  Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives, AM. BAR ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_to_justice.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
25  See Resource Center for Access to Justice Initiatives – State ATJ Commission Directory, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/initiatives/resource_center_for_access_ 
to_justice/state_atj_commissions.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2014) (providing a directory of links for the various state access 
to justice initiatives). 
26  See CTR. ON COURT ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 23, at 2-4 (discussing the role of state 
supreme courts and state judges in lower courts). 
27  Lippman, supra note 15, at 13. Chief Judge Lippman also authored a leading article on the work of the 
task force that he put into place. Id. at 17-21 (discussing the burden on the court presented by unrepresented litigants and 
emphasizing the importance of judicial leadership in solving this gap, including targeting the problems specifically, 
establishing task forces, increasing funding, and reforming the court process to make it simpler). In 2014, Judge Lippman 
also announced a pro bono scholars program for the final semester of law school. See James C. McKinley, Jr., New York 
State’s Top Judge Permits Early Bar Exam in Exchange for Pro Bono Work, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2014, at A22 
(discussing Chief Judge Lippman’s initiative to allow New York law students to take the bar exam in February “in return 
for devoting their last semester to pro bono work”). 
6
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justice is available to all.
28
 Chief Justice Ronald Castille of Pennsylvania led his court to adopt a 
cy pres rule that requires that half of undistributed residual funds in state court class actions go to 
Pennsylvania’s IOLTA program for distribution to providers of free civil legal assistance,
29
 and to 
direct the Court’s pro hac vice funds to support a statewide student loan repayment assistance 
program for lawyers working in qualifying public interest organizations.
30
 
While state judicial leaders have been outspoken advocates for promoting access to 
justice for the poor,
31
 leaders of the federal judiciary have been disappointingly silent. The 2013 
year-end report on the federal judiciary delivered by Chief Justice John Roberts failed to 
acknowledge the civil justice gap or even the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright.
32
 
Similarly, the 2012 year-end report noted the comparatively small amount of funding consumed 
by the judiciary in the overall federal budget as well as multi-year efforts of the judiciary to 
contain costs, but failed to mention decreased federal funding for civil legal aid or the plight of 
low-income litigants who are unable to obtain legal help in the federal courts.
33
 The Chief 
Justice’s year-end reports for 2011 and 2010 were equally silent about the need to promote access 
to justice for low-income Americans, choosing instead to focus on the budgetary concerns of the 
                                                                
28  See John T. Broderick, Jr. & Ronald M. George, A Nation of Do-It-Yourself Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 
2010, at A21 (discussing the importance of coordinating judicial efforts and noting specifically their own efforts in New 
Hampshire and California working with other legal actors in order to shrink the access gap). 
29  See Michael P. Tremoglie, Pa. Starting New Procedures for ‘Cy Pres’ Funds, LEGAL NEWSLINE (May 
14, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/236144-pa-starting-new-procedures-for-cy-pres-funds (reporting the 
modifications to the Pennsylvania civil procedure rules for cy pres to direct 50% to IOLTA). 
30  In a news release issued on June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania “announced a student loan 
forgiveness program for attorneys employed by agencies that help people who cannot afford legal representation.” News 
Release, Admin. Office of Pa. Cts., Student Loan Assistance to Boost Public Legal Service (June 28, 2010) available at 
http://www.pacourts.us/assets/files/newsrelease-1/file-1380.pdf?cb=10a509. The program is administered by the 
Pennsylvania Bar Foundation using the Supreme Court’s pro hac vice funds granted to the Foundation by the Pennsylvania 
IOLTA program. See id; see also Pennsylvania Bar Foundation–PA IOLTA Board Loan Repayment Assistance Program, 
PA. BAR FOUND. http://www.pabarfoundation.org/lrap/lrap.aspx (last visited Oct. 3, 2014); Statewide Loan Repayment 
Assistance Program Begins Fifth Year, PA. LEGAL AID NETWORK, http://www.palegalaid.net/news/plan-e-news/statewide-
loan-repayment-assistance-program-begins-fifth-year (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
31  See Maura Dolan, A Chief Justice’s Lament in a Legal History Lesson, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/12/local/la-me-chief-justice-20130312 (noting the significant “civil rights crisis” 
California faces following budget cuts).Further examples include Judge Fern A. Fisher’s efforts as Director of New York 
State Courts Access to Justice Program and Judge Annette Rizzo’s mortgage foreclosure diversion pilot program in 
Philadelphia. See JONATHAN LIPPMAN ET AL., NEW YORK STATE COURTS ACCESS TO JUSTICE PROGRAM 2013 REPORT iii 
(2014), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ip/nya2j/pdfs/NYA2J_2013report.pdf (featuring Judge Fisher’s letter 
describing the efforts undertaken this year and the problems still faced); Peter Hall, Phila. Anti-Foreclosure Program 
Touted as National Model, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 27, 2008 (discussing the mandatory free counseling and other 
features of the pilot program and their effects on access to justice outcomes) (accessible through Lexis). 
32  See generally JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2013 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2013). 
While the Supreme Court has recognized increased challenges in accessing justice, the high Court’s primary focus in year-
end reports has been on the Court’s limited budget and cost-savings effected by the Court, with little or no mention of the 
crisis in civil legal assistance to the poor. See id. at 1 (“The budget remains the single most important issue facing the 
courts.”).  
33  See generally JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2012 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3-5 (2012) 
(discussing specific administrative cost saving changes made by the courts). 
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Court.
34
 
There is a need for strong leadership at all levels of the judiciary. The justice gap 
threatens fairness in every court and reminds us that much work needs to be done if Gideon’s full 
promise is to be achieved in our justice system. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will 
solve this crisis quickly. The most promising strategy is a comprehensive, multi-layered approach 
that integrates many methods of delivering legal assistance to those who cannot afford legal 
counsel. 
At its core, we must continue to aspire to achieve the gold standard of full representation 
for as many indigent families as possible, especially in high priority matters that threaten shelter, 
sustenance, health, safety, and the well-being of children. Full representation is what corporations 
and wealthy individuals expect and receive when their vital legal interests are threatened. In 2006, 
the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted Resolution 112A calling for the provision of 
counsel for indigent individuals as a matter of right in contested matters where basic human needs 
are at stake.
35
 This action reignited the civil Gideon movement, fostering activities throughout the 
states and intensifying the call for legal help as a matter of right in serious civil cases.
36
 Many 
believe that our constitutional framework demands no less.
37
 
Advocates of a right to counsel in civil cases pressed for recognition of such a right 
before the Supreme Court in Turner v. Rogers, but the high Court rejected a constitutional right to 
legal help in that child support contempt case even though the child’s father (support-obligor) 
spent a full year in a South Carolina jail without having the benefit of a lawyer.
38
 While this result 
                                                                
34  See generally JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2010) 
(detailing the problems the court had faced in 2010 and providing for budget goals going forward); JOHN ROBERTS, JR., 
2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2-3 (2011) (describing changes in the judicial ethics code 
exclusively). While the Federal Judiciary did release a strategic plan in 2010 organized around seven fundamental policy 
questions or challenges affecting the judiciary’s mission, including discussion of providing justice in a more effective 
manner and enhancing access to courts, much of the plan still focused on the Court’s budgetary concerns. See generally 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Sept. 14, 2010) available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/FederalCourts/Publications/StrategicPlan2010.pdf (detailing strategies in response to 
problems faced by the federal judiciary, including simplifying court processes to lower costs). 
35  See AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, RESOLUTION 112A, 1, 12 (2006), available 
at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_06A112A. 
authcheckdam.pdf (urging governments to “provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to low income 
persons . . . where basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health or child 
custody, as determined by each jurisdiction” and arguing that the “right proposed in this resolution is long overdue and 
deeply embedded in the nation’s promise of justice for all.”). 
36  See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FACT SHEET: SARGENT SHRIVER CIVIL COUNSEL ACT (AB 590) 
(FEUER) 1-4 (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/AB-590.pdf (detailing the pilot programs promoting 
civil counsel access for basic needs in California); see also BOS. BAR ASS’N TASK FORCE ON EXPANDING THE CIVIL 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL, GIDEON’S NEW TRUMPET: EXPANDING THE CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS 26-29 
(2008), available at https://www.bostonbar.org/prs/reports/GideonsNewTrumpet.pdf (detailing the Boston Bar 
Association’s inquiry into the civil right to counsel following the 2006 ABA Resolution and proposing solutions). See 
generally NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, http://www.civilrighttocounsel.org (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). 
37  See John Nethercut, “This Issue Will Not Go Away”: Continuing to Seek the Right to Counsel in Civil 
Cases, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. OF POVERTY L. & POL’Y 481, 481-84 (2004) (discussing the role of a constitutionally 
recognized to counsel and potential strategies to obtain it). 
38  131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519-2520 (2011). 
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disappointed advocates seeking to extend Gideon’s promise to civil proceedings, especially where 
a liberty interest was so directly at stake, the Turner opinion also brought new hope to advocates. 
The Supreme Court discussed a court’s duty to ensure that courtrooms are fair to all parties and 
suggested that more complex civil proceedings or actions in which opposing governmental parties 
are routinely represented by counsel may require an appointment of counsel in order to satisfy 
basic due process protections.
39
 
The challenge now falls to advocates to bring this language to life in individual cases 
where such special conditions exist or where courtroom procedures fail to meet fairness 
standards.
40
 Without strong advocacy, the Turner decision is prone to be misread by courts as 
simply a rejection of a right to counsel, without engaging in a probing due process determination 
as to whether counsel is required under the circumstances of an individual case. For this reason, 
lawyers for the poor have a special challenge to educate trial courts and actively press in 
appropriate cases for an appointment of counsel under Turner, as well as to step up efforts to push 
state legislatures and state courts to expand substantive areas in which counsel should be provided 
as a matter of state law or sound public policy.
41
 
While there is no substitute for full-time, paid professionals experienced in the special 
legal needs of the poor, we must also add to their ranks by boosting pro bono participation from 
experienced members of the private bar, law students, newly-admitted lawyers, retired lawyers, 
government lawyers, and in-house counsel, among others. We need all hands on deck, and 
lawyers at both the beginning and twilight of their careers have much to contribute. 
                                                                
39  See id. 
40  See Daniel Curry, The March Toward Justice: Assessing the Impact of Turner v. Rogers on Civil Access-
to-Justice Reforms, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 487, 487 (2012) (“But in Turner v. Rogers, the Supreme Court held there is 
no categorical right to counsel for low-income individuals, even when the proceeding could result in incarceration. 
Nevertheless, Turner is a landmark decision for poor and self-represented litigants. The decision requires judges to 
affirmatively act to ensure due process for self-represented litigants, supports a right to counsel in certain proceedings, and 
bolsters numerous access-to-justice reforms. This Note argues that the Supreme Court's opinion in Turner v. Rogers 
requires court reforms ensuring that everyone, regardless of income, can seek justice in civil courts.”); see also Richard 
Zorza, A New Day for Judges and the Self-Represented: The Implications of Turner v. Rogers, JUDGES’ J. Fall 2011, at 16, 
21 (“Turner holds that judicial intervention is appropriate and sometimes necessary to ensure due process in self-
represented cases. The best practices described here suggest the relative ease of making such interventions where the 
parties lack representation. These interventions clearly lie within the traditional discretionary power of a judge to manage 
the courtroom and the receipt of evidence. Finally, it must not be forgotten that, under Turner, if a judge feels that the 
procedures that he or she can appropriately adopt are not sufficient to ensure fairness and accuracy in the protection of 
constitutionally protected interests, there may be a constitutional requirement for counsel.”). 
41  For example, several state legislatures have mandated a right to counsel in dependency, adoption, 
involuntary termination of parental rights and involuntary mental health treatment civil proceedings. See generally Paul 
Marvy & Laura Klein Abel, Current Developments in Advocacy to Expand the Civil Right to Counsel, 25 TOURO L. REV. 
131, 132-34 (2009) (detailing updates by bar associations and state legislatures in expanding civil access to justice in 
special cases up to 2009); JOHN POLLOCK, NAT’L COAL. FOR A CIVIL RIGHT TO COUNSEL, MOST RECENT CIVIL RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL DEVELOPMENTS 1-6 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_ 
indigent_defendants/2013/05/nat_l_mtg_of_accesstojusticecmmnchairs/ls_sclaid_atj_memo_on_recent_rtc_efforts.authch
eckdam.pdf (detailing the many changes at the state and federal level in law to promote access to justice for families, the 
mentally handicapped, and other groups). One court has construed Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act to mandate a right 
to counsel in immigration cases involving the incompetent. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43613, ALIENS’ 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS: IN BRIEF 9 (2014) (citing Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, 828 F. Supp. 2d 
1133, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2011)). 
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As we move forward, we cannot afford to be stuck in only one mode of legal services 
delivery to the poor. New technologies and changes in the legal environment permit greater use of 
limited scope representation, pilot projects, and court-sponsored or non-profit-sponsored 
initiatives (such as telephone hotlines, help desks, advice-only clinics, and internet resources) to 
ameliorate barriers that impede access to our courts. We certainly can do more to identify court 
procedures that should be simplified or shortened, asking ourselves routinely for each legal 
objective sought: Should a lawyer really be necessary to obtain the desired objective? We must 
make it easier for the public to handle simple matters on their own when other options are just not 
available.
42
 
There are many other measures that might enhance access to justice, but which are less 
likely to secure broad consensus from the organized bar. For example, at least one state now 
licenses non-lawyers to be legal technicians who are permitted to provide basic legal help in 
simple matters after training and licensing, and with supervision.
43
 More extreme, some scholars 
propose an end to the legal profession’s long-standing ban on the corporate practice of law as a 
way of giving the public broad access to routine legal services from large-scale corporate entities 
in places where consumers routinely purchase other goods and services.
44
 Measures such as these 
are controversial, but they are likely to gain increased support if other measures to expand legal 
help do not succeed. 
As many diverse measures go forward to address the justice gap, lawyers also have a 
heightened duty to ensure that ethical rules that regulate the legal profession promote, and do not 
hinder, access to justice. It is here that we must question whether the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which heavily influence the adoption of state ethical rules, have kept pace with the 
needs of the profession and the public.
45
 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
Ethical rules are designed to promote high standards for the legal profession and to 
protect clients and the public from lawyer misconduct.
46
 A genuine commitment to self-regulation 
                                                                
42  A comment was added to Rule 2.2 (Impartiality and Fairness) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that 
clarified judges may assist pro se litigants without violating their duties of impartiality and fairness. See MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. ¶ 4 (2011 ed.), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct/model_code_of_judicial_conduct_canon_2/rule2_2impartiali
tyandfairness/commentonrule2_2.html (“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable accommodations 
to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”). 
43  See WASH. ADMISSION TO PRACTICE R. 28 (2013) (allowing non-lawyers to provide technical help on 
routine matters).  
44  See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to Justice through the (Un)Corporate 
Practice of Law, 38 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 43, 51-52 (Supp. 2014) (noting the importance of large scale legal providers 
that are not lawyers in lowering legal access costs). 
45  Rigorous ethics standards designed for profit-sector lawyering have had an unintended chilling effect on 
pro bono representation and other resources. See Esther Lardent, Do Our Ethical Rules Impair Access to Justice?, NAT’L 
L.J. (May 30, 2013) (outlining ways the current judicial and lawyer ethics codes inhibit representation due to conflict of 
interest concerns, multi-state practice limitations, student limitations, and other reasons) (accessible through Lexis). 
46  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1980) (“Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a 
vital role in the preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their 
relationship with and function in our legal system.”). 
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is a hallmark of the legal profession and is especially important today, as law is increasingly 
viewed as a business. The preamble of the Model Rules instructs, “The profession has a 
responsibility to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and not in 
furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.”
47
 The Model Rules are the 
organized bar’s voice in providing guidance to lawyers as they are called upon to fulfill their 
responsibilities to clients, the legal system, and themselves.
48
 
Viewed in their entirety, the ethical rules are framed primarily from the perspective of a 
traditional lawyering model in which for-profit lawyers provide legal services to paying clients 
after careful review and detailed discussion in traditional office settings conducive to the needs of 
both lawyer and client. The lawyer chooses whether to accept a prospective client for 
representation after review of the prospective client’s objectives, the merits of potential claims 
and defenses, and the client’s ability to pay the fees of the lawyer. In this model, prospective 
clients possess the financial resources and sophistication to shop around and to help shape the 
terms of a representation agreement reasonably tailored to the client’s needs, after consideration 
of material benefits and risks. In this traditional model, the marketplace works for many, but not 
for all. 
To promote the ethical practice of law in a self-regulated profession, the Model Rules 
constrain a lawyer’s conduct in dealing with clients, tribunals, and third persons. The Rules also 
integrate ambiguity and vagueness in order to give lawyers flexibility to exercise professional 
judgment when balancing competing interests in situations where context matters greatly.
49
 
Ambiguity and vagueness also serve important enactment purposes that permit drafters to agree 
upon text that will be flexible enough to provide guidance in many different contexts.
50
 
Ambiguity and vagueness are not without cost, however, especially when they combine to chill 
needed lawyering activities that would otherwise expand the availability of legal help to 
underserved populations.
51
 
Unfortunately, the Model Rules infrequently acknowledge the unique challenges of 
                                                                
47  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 12 (2013). 
48  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 9 (2013) (noting the many potential conflicts that may 
arise in a lawyer’s practice and prescribing guidance through the rules). 
49  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 16 (2013) (noting that the rules are enforced through 
voluntary efforts and “provide a framework for the ethical practice of law”). 
50  See Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of 
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 628 (2002) (“Ambiguity serves a legislative 
purpose. When legislators perceive a need to compromise they can, among other strategies, obscure the particular meaning 
of a statute, allowing different legislators to read the obscured provisions the way they wish.”) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
51  See David Hricik, Uncertainty, Confusion, and Despair: Ethics and Large-Firm Practice in Texas, 16 
REV. LITIG. 705, 707 (1997) (“The principal impact of the legal ethical rules is to create uncertainty, doubt, and confusion 
with regard to the propriety of many activities which occur on a daily basis in the legal profession . . . . Because of this 
uncertainty, inefficiencies result, hampering the delivery of legal services.”); see also In re Application of Okla. Bar Ass’n 
to Amend the Okla. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, 171 P.3d 780, 781 (Okla. 2007) (“The Rules of Professional Conduct often 
prescribe terms for resolving such conflicts. Within the framework of these Rules, however, many difficult issues of 
professional discretion can arise.”) (emphasis omitted); Mark H. Aultman, Moral Character and Professional Regulation, 
8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 110 (1994) (“[T]here are many due process short-cuts necessary to keep discipline systems 
functioning . . . . They make the system more unfair to lawyers against whom it is applied, but they are less likely to be 
applied against lawyers who can effectively demand fairness.”). 
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providing legal services to indigent clients in settings that do not resemble the traditional 
lawyering model. The rules provide very little guidance about fulfilling professional 
responsibilities when lawyers attempt to serve poor or disadvantaged litigants in high volume 
settings that occur outside of traditional law offices. Despite enormous changes in the legal 
profession and rapid advances in technology over the past decade, there have been relatively few 
changes to the Model Rules that provide meaningful guidance to lawyers who struggle in non-
traditional settings to assist low-income individuals who have little access to legal help. 
Model Rule 6.1 recognizes the importance of encouraging pro bono legal services, but 
the rule remains aspirational and it has not been modified since the Ethics 2000 Commission 
completed its review almost fifteen years ago. At a time when the poor so desperately need legal 
help, Rule 6.1’s call for fifty hours of annual pro bono legal service is honored more in the 
breach.
52
 According to the ABA’s latest pro bono survey of lawyers, only one-third of lawyers 
reach the fifty-hour goal.
53
 Despite this fact and the widening justice gap, Model Rule 6.1 remains 
static. At the same time, some states are adopting new court rules in an attempt to secure greater 
pro bono assistance from retired lawyers, in-house counsel, law students, and newly minted 
lawyers. Model Rule 6.1 is stuck at the status quo. 
The two most significant changes to the Model Rules since 2000 relating to access to 
justice are probably Model Rules 6.5 and 1.2(c). As discussed later in this Article, Rule 6.5 
relaxes conflict rules for lawyers when participating in court-sponsored or non-profit legal 
services projects. Yet the rule surprisingly speaks only to that one issue, and not to the many other 
ethical issues implicated by short-term service in such projects. Rule 6.5 appears to be directed 
mostly at private lawyers, without corresponding consideration of the range of ethical challenges 
that confront all lawyers, especially full-time public interest lawyers, in these special settings. 
Similarly, more recent amendments to Model Rule 1.2(c) encourage greater use of 
limited scope representation so that unbundled legal services may reach the poor, but once again 
the amended rule is written largely from the perspective of for-profit lawyers without serious 
mention of the unique settings in which non-profit lawyers find themselves when delivering 
expanded access to the poor. Rule 1.2(c) appears more concerned with lowering the cost of legal 
services for paying clients so that larger segments of middle- and upper-class Americans will be 
encouraged to seek greater legal help from the private bar, rather than addressing the challenges 
of non-profit and pro bono lawyers trying to serve low-income communities in discrete ways. 
Legal aid organizations struggle to provide legal help to millions of indigent individuals 
and families who need their help.
54
 For these prospective clients, obtaining full representation 
from a legal services lawyer is sometimes compared to winning the lottery. It is more likely than 
not that they will be turned down because demand so greatly outstrips supply.
55
 As a result, many 
                                                                
52  See JANET BUCZEK ET AL., ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUBLIC SERV., SUPPORTING 
JUSTICE III: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO WORK OF AMERICA’S LAWYERS 34 (2013) available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/probono_public_service/ls_pb_Supporting_Justice_III_final.
authcheckdam.pdf (finding that only one-third of all lawyers satisfy the aspirational goal of fifty hours of pro bono service 
annually, and eleven percent of all lawyers provide no pro bono service at all). 
53  Id. 
54  For example, the Legal Services Corporation estimates that 61.8 million Americans were eligible for 
services in 2012 – a year in which legal aid organizations served nearly two million people. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., 
2012 FACT BOOK 7, 22 (2013), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/lsc.gov/files/LSC/lscgov4/AnnualReports/ 
2012_Fact%20Book_FINALforWEB.pdf. 
55  See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL 
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indigent clients are only able to obtain pieces of information, small doses of advice, or limited 
assistance through hotlines, help desks, Internet resources, and advice-only clinics. The reality is 
that indigent litigants frequently proceed without any representation in state courts: 
Nationally, more than three out of five cases have at least one unrepresented 
party. Particularly high volume courts, such as traffic, housing, family, and 
small claims, are crowded with pro se litigants. While the reasons for the 
dramatic increase in pro se representation may vary, the impact on courts’ 
operations is considerable.
56
 
The legal community is encouraged to develop programs that will assist self-represented 
individuals, as the number of self-represented litigants is unlikely to decrease without a 
substantial response from the bar.
57
 Most troubling, of course, to this direction is that “pro se 
litigants are less likely to obtain equal justice when compared to litigants represented by 
competent counsel.”
58 
In most instances, the ethical rules that constrain private lawyers representing 
corporations and paying individuals apply equally to lawyers providing free legal help to indigent 
clients where there is no profit motive involved. While there is good reason to hold all lawyers to 
the same high level of professional duty regardless of the financial status of their clients, there 
must also be recognition that some constraints are unnecessary in non-profit settings and may 
actually diminish the availability of legal help when it is needed most. 
                                                                
LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 9 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (“[F]or every client served by an LSC-funded program, at 
least one person seeking help will be turned down due to limited resources. This conclusion is almost identical to the 
‘Unable to Serve’ finding of the 2005 study.”) (emphasis omitted). 
56  Alicia M. Farley, An Important Piece of the Bundle: How Limited Appearances Can Provide an Ethically 
Sound Way to Increase Access to Justice for Pro Se Litigants, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 563, 564 (2007) (footnotes 
omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
57  See Alan T. Schroeder, Jr., Why Access to Justice Is Important, AALL SPECTRUM, July 2010 at 24, 27 
(“Justices Broderick and George encourage the legal community to pitch in during these times by creating various 
programs for pro se litigants . . . More now then [sic] ever, ‘Access to Justice’ and ‘Equal Access to Justice’ type 
programs are critical for our society. The self-represented litigant isn’t going away anytime soon.”); Richard Zorza, An 
Overview of Self-Represented Litigation Innovation, Its Impact, and an Approach for the Future: An Invitation to 
Dialogue, 43 FAM. L.Q. 519, 521 (2009) (“There is absolutely no reason to believe that the phenomenon of self-
representation is going to go away. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will increase. The vast majority 
of the self-represented make that choice, not for any political or self-image reason, but for simple economic reasons. . . . 
The current trends in the economy can only make matters worse, forcing more litigants to forgo lawyers.”). 
58  See Farley, supra note 56 (noting specifically the worse outcomes in North Carolina); see also Sande L. 
Buhai, Access to Justice for Unrepresented Litigants: A Comparative Perspective, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 979, 979 (2009) 
(“The problem of access to justice is one that affects the ordinary American who cannot afford an attorney and is 
disqualified from receiving free legal aid, and thus must rely on self-representation in court. But, the unrepresented litigant 
often does not stand a chance against the represented litigant. Herein lies the problem—unequal access to justice. Self-help 
centers, alternative dispute resolution options, and the unbundling of legal services have not adequately addressed this 
problem. Judges may be able to help unrepresented litigants, but under the American adversarial system of justice, 
stringent limitations on judicial activism prohibit such interference. In contrast, in many civil law countries, the legal 
system and the role of the judge are construed differently, resulting in greater access to justice for ordinary citizens. There 
are aspects of the civil law system that the American system may borrow in its effort to expand access to justice for all.”). 
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In short, some ethical rules grounded in the traditional lawyering model do not translate 
well to public interest projects where profit motives are not present. It is in these settings that such 
rules can actually hinder the flow of free legal services. The profession should ask itself whether 
one rule really fits all, especially when lawyers are helping the poor by delivering unbundled 
services in community or other non-traditional settings. Model Rule 6.5 can be viewed as an 
acknowledgment that the public and the profession are better served when ethical requirements 
that are designed for formal settings, but which actually hinder pro bono help in community 
settings, are relaxed to expand legal assistance to the poor. Similarly, an easing of certain other 
ethical constraints in non-profit contexts will achieve important societal objectives without 
undermining ethical standards of the profession. 
In the following sections, this Article looks briefly at three model rules of professional 
conduct to illustrate areas of possible change in light of access to justice goals. All three rules are 
critically important to indigent clients. First, the Article examines document assistance and 
limited scope representation under Model Rules 1.2 and 6.5, which are vital to self-represented 
litigants who seek help from court-sponsored or non-profit projects. Second, the Article questions 
the wisdom of current restrictions on financial assistance by lawyers under Rule 1.8 when 
financial help to the poor is needed to preserve the status quo or prevent immediate harm while 
awaiting the outcome of legal proceedings. Third, the Article discusses withdrawal of 
representation rules under Model Rule 1.16 and suggests that modifications would facilitate 
increased volunteer assistance from lawyers wishing to assist self-represented individuals in 
limited ways. From a more global perspective, this Article questions whether key assumptions 
underlying the Model Rules, which are appropriate in a traditional, profit-making lawyering 
paradigm, should apply to constrain lawyers when delivering free legal services to the poor. This 
Article argues that outright prohibitions contained in some model rules, and intentional ambiguity 
and vagueness in others, act to inhibit access to justice. 
I. LIMITED SCOPE REPRESENTATION 
In 2013, the American Bar Association urged lawyers to increase the availability, use, 
and advertising of unbundled legal services. ABA Resolution 108, adopted on February 11, 2013, 
encouraged lawyers to limit the scope of their representation in order to increase the public’s 
access to legal help.
59
 Model Rule 1.2(c), which was last revised in 2002, provides that “[a] 
lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is reasonable under the 
circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”
60
 Since its adoption, forty-one states have 
enacted an identical or similar limited representation rule.
61
 
Over the past decade, the organized bar has expressed increasing concern that many 
Americans are not using legal services even when they can afford to purchase them, and may not 
be aware of their ability to limit the scope of representation and thereby reduce costs through the 
sharing of responsibilities. Bar leaders have also received input from trial judges about the need to 
                                                                
59  ABA House of Delegates, Res. 108, at 44 (2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/2013/05/nat_l_mtg_of_accesstojusticecmmnchairs/ls_sclaid_atj_adopted_
unbundling_resolution_108.authcheckdam.pdf. 
60  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2013). 
61  ABA House of Delegates, Res. 108, at 49 (2013). Some states have adopted a modified rule requiring the 
client’s consent in writing, and several others have “set out a checklist of tasks to be assumed when the lawyer provides a 
limited scope of representation.” Id. 
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provide greater legal assistance to self-represented litigants.
62
 Resolution 108 urges lawyers to 
embrace limited scope representation because “[t]he organized bar has an obligation to use all 
reasonable resources to assure people have access to the benefits that can only be provided by 
lawyers.”
63
 
While limited scope representation permits lawyers to unbundle their services, they are 
not excused from meeting many professional obligations required in full representation. 
Resolution 108 states: 
Rule [1.2(c)] places the burden on the lawyer to determine if and when limited 
scope representation is appropriate. The lawyer must measure the capacity of 
the potential client to assume the responsibility of the segmented tasks. . . . The 
lawyer must both measure the capability of the potential client and the 
complexity of the legal issue to meet this standard. Consequently, the lawyer 
must be every bit as competent in the subject matter as a lawyer who 
exclusively provides full services in that field.
64
 
Under Rule 1.2(c), “[a] lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation 
is reasonable” and the lawyer obtains informed consent from the client.
65
 The comment to Rule 
1.2(c) emphasizes that “limited representation does not exempt a lawyer from the duty to provide 
competent representation, [although] the limitation is a factor to be considered when determining 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”
66
 Agreements to limit representation must be in accord with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct and other law,
67
 and a lawyer must be competent in the subject matter for 
which limited representation is provided.
68
 
In 2002, the ABA modified the language of Rule 1.2(c).
69
 Originally, the rule read, “A 
lawyer may limit the objectives of the representation if the client consents after consultation.”
70
 
The revision reads, “A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation is 
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”
71
 Informed consent 
                                                                
62  See id. at 46 (“High percentages of judges reported that self-represented litigants failed to include 
important evidence, committed procedural errors and were ineffective in raising objections, examining witnesses and 
crafting arguments. Nearly two-thirds of the judges reported that the outcomes of self-represented parties were worse than 
if they had been represented.”). 
63  Id. at 52. 
64  Id. at 49. 
65  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) (2013). 
66  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt ¶ 7 (2013).  
67  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. ¶ 8 (2013). 
68  ABA House of Delegates, Res. 108, at 49 (2013) (“Consequently, the lawyer must be every bit as 
competent in the subject matter as a lawyer who exclusively provides full services in that field.”). 
69  See Ethics 2000 Commission Report on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_ 
rule12.html. 
70  Id. (emphasis added). 
71  Id. (emphasis added). 
15
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requires the lawyer to explain to the client the material risks of a proposed course of action and to 
inform the client of reasonably available alternatives to a proposed course of conduct.
72
 Equally 
important, a lawyer must make a careful judgment whether competent assistance may be rendered 
in a limited fashion. To do so, the lawyer is expected to assess “the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary” for limited representation.
73
 
In short, a lawyer who unbundles legal services is not excused from complying with core 
ethical requirements that apply to full representation, including duties of competence,
74
 
diligence,
75
 communication,
76
 confidentiality,
77
 conflict avoidance,
78
 and formation of 
representation agreements.
79
 Resolution 108 emphasizes that local bar associations should take 
measures to assure that practitioners who limit the scope of their representation do so with “full 
understanding and recognition of their professional obligations . . . .”
80
 
The fulfillment of these formal ethical duties anticipates a traditional lawyering model in 
which a lawyer and prospective client meet in the lawyer’s office and have ample time to discuss 
the respective merits of full representation versus limited representation and the attendant benefits 
and risks of each. It assumes that prospective clients do not present language barriers, literacy 
issues, or learning disabilities, and are able to provide informed consent for limited representation, 
after full consideration of the reasonable alternatives available to them. In the real world, 
however, this is a scenario that more accurately describes what takes place in the traditional 
lawyering model with well-resourced clients who desire to limit representation in order to reduce 
costs or who are willing and able to undertake shared responsibilities. But, in the context of high 
volume clinics or legal hotlines, in which lawyers struggle to provide limited assistance to the 
poor on the theory that some help is better than none, it is a scenario that is unrealistic and 
unworkable.
81
 
How does a responsible lawyer meet such professional duties over the telephone while 
                                                                
72  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(e) (2013). 
73  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2013) (noting the competence required in any kind of 
representation, including limited representation). 
74  Id. 
75  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2013). 
76  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2013). 
77  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013). 
78  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7-1.12 (2013); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
6.5 (2013) (noting conflict checks for a lawyer providing short-term legal services). 
79  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2013). 
80  ABA House of Delegates, Res. 108, at 53. 
81  See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., AN ANALYSIS OF RULES THAT 
ENABLE LAWYERS TO SERVE PRO SE LITIGANTS 8 (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/delivery/downloads/prose_white_paper.authcheckdam.pdf (“While written consent to a 
limited representation is clearly a best practice . . . the Committee believed that such an ethical requirement would 
frustrate the ability of lawyers to provide services through telephone hotlines . . . or other electronic communications that 
do not lend themselves to an exchange of written or signed documents.”). This acknowledgement that expression of 
informed consent could occur verbally allowed an expansion of limited representation but did not fully resolve potential 
ethical conflicts under the Rules of Professional Conduct or applicable civil procedure rules, though there continue to be 
key questions in its execution from state to state. See id. at 8-10 (detailing different rules adopted by various states).  
16
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many other callers are waiting to access the hotline? How does a lawyer help a client to weigh 
benefits and risks of limited representation, knowing that the prospective client has no realistic 
alternatives for legal help? How does a lawyer determine the reasonableness of limited 
representation when full representation is simply not an option? How does a client provide 
informed consent when the proposed course of action is largely beyond the client’s 
comprehension or capacity due to no fault of the client? These are just some of the difficult 
questions that arise in non-traditional venues where limited help to the poor is frequently needed. 
It is in the courthouse corridors or over the telephone that lawyers are increasingly called upon to 
make these professional judgments on the spot. And, yet, the Model Rules are silent or, at best, 
vague about the real world ethical challenges that public interest lawyers routinely confront and 
which too often deter private lawyers from volunteering for fear of violating ethical duties.
82
 
A. Document Assistance to Self-Represented Litigants 
One of the most important forms of limited scope representation to the poor takes the 
form of document assistance. Indigent clients frequently need help in preparing documents for 
filing in court so that they may preserve claims, vacate default judgments, or comply with 
technical court rules that are beyond their understanding or skill. Consider the plight of a low-
income tenant who is unable to attend an eviction hearing due to her child’s serious health 
problems and later discovers that a default judgment has been entered against her. She bears the 
burden of filing a motion, memorandum of law, or other legal document in an attempt to open the 
judgment so that she may have her day in court. To be successful, she will be expected to know 
the legal requirements for opening a default judgment and to apply the facts of her situation to the 
legal requirements in a timely, coherent court filing. Many indigent individuals cannot manage 
this task successfully without legal help; yet full representation is often unavailable due to scarce 
resources. The only realistic option for this tenant may be to turn to a help desk or advice-only 
clinic, if they exist in her locale, in order to obtain limited help in preparing court documents that 
might offer her a fair chance of having her day in court and preventing the loss of her home. 
The need for document assistance arises in almost every substantive area of the law 
affecting the poor. Consider the legal needs of a minimum-wage, immigrant restaurant employee 
who busses tables for several weeks but is never paid fully for his work. He files a wage claim on 
his own in small claims court and successfully represents himself before a judge. He is gratified 
by a favorable court decision, but soon learns that the restaurant’s counsel has filed an appeal to 
the county court of general jurisdiction where the employer has a right to a trial de novo. The low-
income worker is now in a formal court and must prepare and file proper legal pleadings to 
prosecute his claim. He may also need to respond to discovery requests or legal motions, but he is 
unable to do this on his own and the local legal aid program does not have sufficient resources to 
represent him. Without legal help, the worker runs a serious risk of losing the benefit of the prior 
judgment he rightfully earned, not because his claim lacks merit but solely because he cannot 
navigate the technical requirements of a more formal court on his own. His only hope may be to 
                                                                
82  Under Rule 1.1 and its comment, a lawyer is required to exercise “[c]ompetent handling of a particular 
matter [that] includes inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem . . . [but an] agreement 
between the lawyer and the client regarding the scope of the representation may limit the matters for which the lawyer is 
responsible.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. ¶ 5 (2013). Even with this exception, the requirement of 
“inquiry” still leads to an unsettled question of whether a lawyer who provides only limited help or information, especially 
in a clinic-like setting, complies with the rule.  
17
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reach out for document assistance from a non-profit legal provider, court-sponsored help desk, or 
advice-only clinic. Without any help, he is plunged into a legal world that is unfriendly and 
unforgiving. 
In circumstances such as these, lawyers who are unable to undertake full representation 
may be willing to provide a limited amount of undisclosed help that will give clients a fair chance 
of having their claims or defenses heard. But, many lawyers are hesitant to provide undisclosed 
document assistance because they know that some courts have labeled this form of limited 
assistance “ghostwriting”
83
 and have criticized it as unethical. At times, some judges have even 
sanctioned lawyers for engaging in this practice.
84
 
Federal courts in particular have harshly criticized the practice of ghostwriting. At least 
two circuit courts of appeals have long held that lawyers may not ghostwrite appellate briefs.
85
 
Federal district courts have also frequently condemned ghostwriting by lawyers. A Pennsylvania 
district court found that ghostwriting for a pro se litigant “implicates the lawyer’s duty of candor 
to the Court[,] . . . . interfere[s] with the Court’s ability to superintend the conduct of counsel and 
parties during the litigation[,]” and misrepresents the litigant’s right to a more liberal construction 
of his pleadings as a pro se litigant.
86
 Similarly, a New Jersey district court opined that 
ghostwriting contravenes the spirit of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and held that 
undisclosed ghostwriting of briefs or other submissions to the Court is improper.
87
 
More recently, a Nevada federal court condemned ghostwriting as a violation of Rule 11 
responsibilities and a misrepresentation to the court.
88
 A federal court in Virginia issued a “Ghost-
Writer Warning” to lawyers, specifically warning that sanctions may arise from such unethical 
activities.
89
 In the past few years, several other district courts have condemned ghostwriting as a 
                                                                
83  “Ghostwriting” is a term commonly used to describe unbundled legal services, limited scope 
representation, or discrete task representation in which an attorney drafts court or agency documents for a pro se litigant, 
but does not reveal to the tribunal on the papers or otherwise that an attorney assisted in the document preparation. The 
term is most often used in the litigation context, although the practice also occurs in transactional settings. See Pa. Bar 
Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility & Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Joint Formal Op. 
2011-100, at 1, 3 (2011), available at http://www.padisciplinaryboard.org/documents/PBAJointFormalOpinion2011-
100.pdf. 
84  See, e.g., John C. Rothermich, Note, Ethical and Procedural Implications of “Ghostwriting” for Pro Se 
Litigants: Toward Increased Access to Civil Justice, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2687, 2701 (“[In 1985, the Illinois State Bar 
Association] admonished as unethical a bankruptcy attorney who provided limited drafting services to his clients and 
subsequently refused to attend hearings or meetings with creditors.”).  
85  See Duran v. Carris, 238 F.3d 1268, 1272-73 (10th Cir. 2001) (cautioning that a lawyer must sign 
ghostwritten briefs); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328 (1st Cir. 1971) (noting that a member of the bar must sign any 
briefs he substantially helps to prepare). 
86  See United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 966 F. Supp. 361, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (noting that ghostwriting 
and not signing is a violation of candor and tampers with the courts ability to be lenient on pro se clients). 
87  See Delso v. Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL 766349, 
at *16 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (noting that while “ghostwriting may not per se violate Fed. R. Civ. P 11 . . . , it clearly 
violates the intention that attorneys be responsible for their submissions to the Court.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (defining the 
rules on signing pleadings, motions, other papers, and representations to the court). 
88  Liguori v. Hansen, No. 2:11–cv–00492–GMN–CWH, 2012 WL 760747, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 6, 2012).  
89  Davis v. Back, No. 3:09cv557, 2010 WL 1779982, at *11 (E.D. Va. Apr. 29, 2010); see Bush v. Adams, 
No. 3:09cv674, 2010 WL 2640064, at *3 (E.D. Va. June 29, 2010) (finding that the plaintiff “impermissibly utilized an 
attorney ghost-writer” and discussing previous warning to plaintiff about possible sanctions for this action). Another 
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violation of Rule 11.
90
 These decisions have all discouraged well-intentioned lawyers from 
providing undisclosed document assistance to the poor. 
On the other hand, two recent federal circuit court opinions may signal an easing of such 
harsh judicial treatment when well-intentioned ghostwriting takes place. The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals declined to sanction an attorney accused of ghostwriting petitions for pro se 
litigants.
91
 Noting that several ethics bodies, including the ABA, have found ghostwriting to be 
ethical under appropriate circumstances,
92
 the Circuit Court found that the ghostwriting lawyer 
was motivated by a desire to help her clients, rather than to seek unfair advantage in court.
93
 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a Florida district court’s entry of 
sanctions against a lawyer who filled in blanks on a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition for a debtor, 
without signing the lawyer’s name.
94
 These two decisions may reflect a new direction emerging 
among federal courts on the practice of ghostwriting, but it is too early to know for certain. 
In contrast to many federal court decisions condemning undisclosed document 
assistance, the American Bar Association has provided guidance to lawyers that the practice is 
ethical.
95
 In 2007, an ABA formal opinion concluded that undisclosed assistance is not an ethical 
violation, unless a jurisdiction specifically prohibits the practice
96
 or the lawyer does so “in a 
manner that violates rules that otherwise would apply to the lawyer’s conduct.”
97
 The ABA 
opinion found that a lawyer may provide legal assistance to litigants appearing pro se before 
tribunals and help prepare written submissions without disclosing the nature or extent of their 
assistance.
98
 While acknowledging the existence of conflicting professional guidance opinions on 
                                                                
Virginia federal court criticized ghostwriting assistance provided to a plaintiff, finding that “‘ghostwriting’ motions for a 
pro se plaintiff is contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the privilege of liberal construction 
afforded to pro se litigants.” Couch v. Jabe, No. 7:09-cv-00434, 2010 WL 1416730, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Va. Apr. 8, 2010) 
(emphasis omitted). There has also been strong condemnation by federal courts in Illinois. See, e.g., Thigpen v. Banas, No. 
08 C 4820, 2010 WL 520189, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 11, 2010) (refusing to accept an amended complaint because it was 
ghostwritten). 
90  See, e.g., Anderson v. Kohl’s Corp., No. 2:12–cv–00822, 2013 WL 1874812, at *2 n.4 (W.D. Pa. May 3, 
2013) (noting the quality of the pleadings and threatening a warning to the lawyer if they had been ghostwritten); Kear v. 
Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, 12–1235–JAR–KGG, 2012 WL 5417321, at *1 (D. Kan. Nov. 6, 2012) (noting that undisclosed 
ghostwriting could work to circumvent Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and should not be condoned). 
91  See In re Fengling Liu, 664 F.3d 367, 372-73 (2d. Cir. 2011) (noting that the ambiguity in the area 
prevented clear knowledge of the wrongness of ghostwriting). 
92  Id. at 370-72. 
93  Id. at 373. 
94  See In re Hood, 727 F.3d 1360, 1365 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that filling in blanks on a standard form 
petition is not drafting a document and the lawyer’s assistance was not substantive enough to constitute fraud, even where 
local rules required the insertion of a statement when drafting documents that were prepared with the assistance of 
counsel). 
95  ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-446 (2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/delivery/downloads/aba_07_446_2007.authcheckda
m.pdf (discussing undisclosed legal assistance to pro se litigants). 
96  See id. at 2 n.6. 
97  Id. at 4. 
98  Id. (“We conclude that there is no prohibition in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct against 
19
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the subject, the ABA’s guidance opinion concluded that attorney ghostwriting is ethical and 
disclosure is not required by the rules of professional conduct.
99
 
In 2011, the Pennsylvania Bar Association Committee on Legal Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility and the Philadelphia Bar Association Professional Guidance Committee issued a 
joint formal opinion on the ethics of limited scope engagements.
100
 The joint opinion concluded 
that undisclosed document assistance is not an ethical violation under the Pennsylvania Rules of 
Professional Conduct and lawyers may provide such limited representation so long as it is 
reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.
101
 The joint opinion 
rejected the notion that ghostwriting provides an unfair advantage to pro se litigants, noting 
instead that lawyers are encouraged to render public interest legal service under Rule 6.1, and 
limited scope representation, which is intended to expand access to justice, is envisioned by Rule 
6.5.
102
 The Pennsylvania bar opinion also supported the ABA’s position that attorney disclosure is 
not required in the absence of a rule or some other source of authority requiring it,
103
 but 
cautioned that attorneys must understand that all professional responsibility rules that apply to 
non-limited representation also apply to limited scope arrangements.
104
 
                                                                
undisclosed assistance to pro se litigants, as long as the lawyer does not do so in a manner that violates rules that otherwise 
would apply to the lawyer’s conduct.”). 
99  Id. at 3-4. 
100  Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility & Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance 
Comm., Joint Formal Op. 2011-100 (2011). 
101  Id. at 16. 
102  Id. at 4. 
103  The opinion also notes that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not require attorney disclosure. 
Id. at 12. It rejects the contention that Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 3.3—providing that a lawyer shall not 
knowingly “make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact 
or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer”—or Pennsylvania Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4—barring a 
lawyer from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or from conduct “that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice”—necessarily prohibits undisclosed ghostwriting, as non-disclosure is not a 
misrepresentation to the court and is not dishonest so long as it is not abused. Id. at 12; PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
3.3 (2012); PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2012). To the contrary, Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct 
1.2 and 1.6 emphasize the rights of the client to limited scope representation, as well as a lawyer’s duty to respect a 
client’s wish that legal assistance be limited or remain confidential or undisclosed. Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics 
and Prof’l Responsibility & Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Joint Formal Op. 2011-100, at 13 (2011).  
104  Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility & Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance 
Comm., Joint Formal Op. 2011-100, at 15 (2011). New Jersey’s professional guidance committee has also opined on this 
subject. See N.J. Advisory Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 713, at 4-5 (2008) available at 
https://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/ethics/ACPE713.pdf (detailing the changes in ghostwriting policies as it applies 
to New Jersey lawyers). The New Jersey opinion, issued after the ABA 2007 opinion on ghostwriting, acknowledged the 
ABA’s “concern for expanding legal assistance to the unrepresented” that is represented in changes made to the ABA 
Model Rule 1.2(c) and by the addition of Model Rule 6.5. Id. at 2. In examining whether disclosure is required, the 
Committee acknowledged the applicability of Rule 1.6(a) and the duty of confidentiality to limited representation 
situations, but also noted the concerns expressed by some courts that “ghostwriting is unethical per se as a fraud upon the 
court” in the absence of notice to the court that attorney assistance was rendered. Id. at 3. It noted further that some courts 
require a limited duty of disclosure, depending on the amount or nature of legal aid rendered. Id. at 3. The New Jersey 
Committee concluded that “[d]isclosure is not required if the limited assistance [to the unrepresented] is part of an 
organized . . . program designed to provide legal assistance to people of limited means.” Id. at 4. However, disclosure is 
required “where such assistance is a tactic by a lawyer or party to gain advantage in litigation by invoking traditional 
20
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Today, lawyers are confronted by split authority in which many federal courts condemn 
undisclosed document assistance as violating a lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal, while an 
increasing number of professional guidance opinions conclude that the practice is ethical as a 
means of promoting access to our courts. In the face of this split, the Model Rules remain silent. 
Without affirmative authority, many lawyers are understandably reluctant to provide document 
assistance to indigent litigants. The Model Rules’ failure to expressly address this issue misses an 
important opportunity to influence the development of state court rules and to shape professional 
responsibility norms throughout the country. 
Concerns that ghostwriting allows deceptive litigants to gain an unfair advantage in 
litigation simply do not apply to the bulk of honest, indigent litigants who need document 
assistance because they have no other recourse to protect their legal interests. Model Rule 1.2 
could easily be amended to state that it is not an ethical violation for lawyers to provide free 
undisclosed document assistance to indigent litigants so that they may have the opportunity to 
have their legal matters fairly heard.
105
 To the extent that judicial concerns about such a practice 
remain, the Model Rules might also offer helpful guidance in a comment or explanatory note 
suggesting that lawyers consider appending a statement that assistance was provided by a licensed 
member of the bar (without identifying the lawyer). In this way, lawyers may signal to the court 
that some measure of limited legal help was provided, without fear of violating ethical concerns 
and without entering an appearance that might obligate continuing legal help. 
In conclusion, the Model Rules instruct lawyers to adhere to a broad range of 
professional responsibilities associated with full representation when rendering limited assistance, 
but fail to offer meaningful guidance on how lawyers are reasonably expected to fulfill these 
duties under real world circumstances in which the poor present a dire need for legal help. 
Professional guidance opinions are helpful on a case-by-case basis, but the absence of bright line 
guidance in the Model Rules misses an important opportunity to influence the development of 
professional norms and the crafting of local court rules that will foster greater legal assistance to 
the poor. 
B. Model Rule 6.5 
Despite the justice gap crisis, there have been relatively few amendments to the Model 
Rules over the past fifteen years that address the special challenges of delivering legal services to 
low-income individuals. One notable exception is Model Rule 6.5. A product of the ABA Ethics 
2000 Commission’s work, Rule 6.5 recognizes that limited legal representation is increasingly 
delivered in non-traditional settings and a new rule relaxing formal conflict requirements was 
needed to remove obstacles that discouraged private attorneys from volunteering to provide pro 
                                                                
judicial leniency toward pro se litigants while still reaping the benefits of legal assistance . . . . Similarly, disclosure is 
required when, given all the facts, the lawyer, not the pro se litigant, is in fact effectively in control of the final form and 
wording of the pleadings and conduct of the litigation. If neither of these required disclosure situations is present, and the 
limited assistance is simply an effort by an attorney to aid someone who is financially unable to secure an attorney, but is 
not part of an organized program, disclosure is not required.” Id. at 4-5 (emphasis omitted). 
105  The Model Code of Judicial Conduct uses similar language in the comment to Rule 2.2 (Impartiality and 
Fairness) to clarify that judges do not violate ethical rules when assisting self-represented litigants. MODEL CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 cmt. ¶ 4 (2011) (“It is not a violation of this Rule for a judge to make reasonable 
accommodations to ensure pro se litigants the opportunity to have their matters fairly heard.”). 
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bono help.
106
 
Rule 6.5 acknowledges that lawyers will be called upon to provide short-term legal 
assistance in courthouses or community settings as part of special projects conducted by non-
profit organizations or court-sponsored programs.
107
 Many such projects depend upon the private 
bar for volunteers, but many lawyers expressed concern that their participation would create 
unknowing conflicts of interest that would later cause them or their law firms to withdraw or 
decline representation of paying clients.
108
 They also were concerned that their participation might 
constitute lawyer misconduct since they could not reasonably conduct standard conflict checking 
of their law firm records from community locations or while engaged in high-volume clinics.
109
 
To respond to these concerns, Model Rule 6.5 relaxed formal conflict requirements of 
Model Rules 1.7, 1.9, and 1.10 in order to facilitate short-term assistance under these special 
circumstances.
110
 At the same time, the rule retained conflict prohibitions for known actual or 
imputed conflicts,
111
 striking a reasonable balance that promotes access to legal help without 
undermining ethical standards. While Rule 6.5 is a positive step forward in promoting access to 
justice, the rule is narrowly drawn to address only a lawyer’s duty to identify and manage 
potential conflicts of interest in these settings. It does not offer guidance to lawyers on how to 
responsibly manage a range of other ethical duties in short-term, non-traditional settings, 
including duties of competence, diligence, and communication.
112
 
Without such guidance, responsible lawyers are uncertain of the boundaries of their 
ethical duties, causing understandable concerns that chill participation. In Rule 6.5 projects, 
lawyers are uncertain whether they should, or are required, to execute written limited scope 
representation agreements. Are lawyers able to fulfill their duty of competence when called upon 
to advise indigent clients on how to proceed in their cases based upon just a few minutes of 
consultation, often without an opportunity to review relevant documents? May a lawyer ethically 
engage in short-term assistance where there are difficult language barriers that impair 
communication or if it appears to the lawyer that the client lacks the time, sophistication, or 
capacity to implement what both the lawyer and client agree needs to be done? 
While the Model Rules may not be able to anticipate or answer every question that will 
arise in non-traditional settings, the absence of any guidance is troubling and, more to the point, 
chilling upon the voluntary efforts of lawyers. Model Rule 6.5 needs more careful thought with an 
eye toward expanding its reach to address ethical concerns that extend beyond simply managing 
conflicts of interest. An expanded Model Rule 6.5 that provides guidance on difficult questions 
such as these will encourage greater participation from the bar in pilot projects and other access to 
                                                                
106  See ABA ETHICS 2000 COMM’N, ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT TO THE ABA HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES 8 (2001) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_ 
responsibility/report_hod_082001.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining the reasoning for the adoption of Rule 6.5). 
107  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013). 
108  See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVS., supra note 81, at 26. 
109  Id. 
110  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013) (stating a lawyer “is subject to Rules 1.7 and 
1.9(a) only if the lawyer knows that the representation involves a conflict of interest” and is subject to Rule 1.10 only if 
the lawyer knows another lawyer at the firm is disqualified under 1.7 or 1.9(a)). 
111  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013). 
112  See id. 
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justice initiatives designed to increase legal representation to the poor. Silence does not provide 
the ethical guidance or encouragement that lawyers need. 
II. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO INDIGENT CLIENTS 
Under Model Rule 1.8(e), lawyers are permitted to advance court costs for their clients 
and may make repayment contingent upon the outcome of the litigation.
113
 Clients are not 
required to guarantee repayment of advanced costs if the lawyer and the client agree that 
repayment will depend on the success of the litigation.
114
 This principle represents an important 
change from prior provisions that required that clients remain liable for expenses advanced by the 
lawyer for their court costs, investigation expenses, medical examinations, and trial 
presentations.
115
 The change was designed to enhance access to courts for personal injury victims 
seeking court remedies to be made whole. In essence, the change made treatment of court 
expenses largely indistinguishable from that of contingent attorney’s fees.
116
 
The treatment of court costs and litigation expenses in Model Rule 1.8 is one of the few 
places in the Model Rules in which an explicit distinction is drawn based upon the indigent status 
of a client. Lawyers for the poor may pay, and not merely advance, court costs and litigation 
expenses for their indigent clients.
117
 This special provision reflects the reality that many legal 
claims or defenses of the poor are not handled on a contingency basis, and that access to our 
courts is significantly enhanced when lawyers representing indigents are able to pay such costs 
outright.
118
 Abandoning the rule that clients must remain responsible for court costs and litigation 
expenses regardless of outcome and authorizing lawyers for the poor to pay gateway expenses are 
two examples of modest, but important, changes that have fostered access to justice without 
undermining legitimate ethical concerns. 
At the same time, lawyers are not permitted to subsidize lawsuits or guarantee loans to 
their clients for living expenses because of concerns that financial assistance will create conflicts 
of interest between lawyers and clients and may encourage unmeritorious lawsuits.
119
 The Model 
                                                                
113  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2013). 
114  See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 9.2.3 (1986). 
115  See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 10 (1908) (noting that “the lawyer should not 
purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation”); ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Grievances, Formal Op. 288 
(1954) (stating that forwarding living expenses is a violation of multiple canons); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-103(B) (1980) (noting a lawyer may advance financial assistance for the costs of litigation but not 
for living expenses). 
116  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. ¶ 10 (2013); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 36 (2000) (stating that a lawyer shall not extend financial assistance except in the covering of 
court costs and expenses of litigation). 
117  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (2013) (“[A] lawyer representing an indigent client 
may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client.”). 
118  Court filing fees may be waived if an indigent client is granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status, but some 
other necessary litigation expenses are generally not included within IFP status. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Levine, In Forma 
Pauperis Litigants: Witness Fees and Expenses in Civil Actions, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1461, 1461-64 (1985) (noting that 
while the federal courts may waive court fees for indigent civil litigants, they must still pay for other necessary expenses 
such as witness retainers). 
119  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. ¶ 10 (2013) (noting that lawyers should not extend 
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Rules prohibit lawyers from making loans to clients for living expenses, even to indigent clients 
under dire circumstances, and are ambiguous as to the precise boundaries of court or litigation 
expenses that are permissible expenditures by lawyers on behalf of their clients. Protectionist 
rules in this context are grounded on the assumption that the supply of lawyers exceeds demand 
and permitting financial assistance by lawyers will have adverse consequences on clients and 
other members of the bar. The ban reflects a fear that financial assistance by lawyers is 
tantamount to purchasing an interest in litigation which clients will be required to repay, and that 
lawyers who market their ability to extend funds to clients will gain an unfair advantage.
120
 The 
prohibition also seeks to protect clients who may be unduly influenced by promises of financial 
assistance when making representational decisions.
121
 
Courts have disciplined lawyers for violating this basic prohibition,
122
 although they are 
                                                                
loans for living expenses because it would encourage lawsuits that would otherwise not be brought). 
120  Current restrictions on financial assistance by lawyers are based upon three historical doctrines: 
champerty (acquisition of a share of another’s claim), maintenance (supporting a litigant to carry on a claim), and barratry 
(incitement or encouragement of another to bring a claim). James E. Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The 
“Acquisition of an Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223, 223-25 (2003) 
(calling the rules “flawed maintenance, champerty, and barratry rules” and explaining their historical bases). Despite these 
rules’ long history, one court found that there was no risk of unfair competition when a lawyer advanced living expenses. 
See In re Ruffalo, 249 F. Supp. 432, 443 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (holding that the making of loans for living expenses to 
“relatively few clients” did not “constitute[] a practice calculated to solicit employment by others” or unethical advertising 
of attorneys services, and that the advances did not constitute the purchase of an interest in the subject matter of the 
litigation where “the clients had an unconditional obligation to repay the advances”). 
121  See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Kandel, 563 A.2d 387, 390 (Md. 1987) (“Clients should 
not be influenced to seek representation based on the ease with which monies can be obtained, in the form of 
advancements, from certain law firms or attorneys.”); Topps v. Pratt & Callis, P.C., 564 N.E.2d 196, 197-98 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1990) (finding an agreement between attorney and client that required attorney to advance living expenses during 
pendency of client’s workers’ compensation case violated the Code of Professional Responsibility and was “void as 
against public policy”); In re Rue, 663 So. 2d 1320, 1320 (Fla. 1995) (reinstating a lawyer after ninety-one day suspension 
“for various offenses including: advancing living expenses to clients”); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Eisenstein, 
635 A.2d 1327, 1337 (Md. 1994) (“Advancing non-litigation related expenses smacks of ‘purchasing an interest in the 
subject matter of the litigation’ in which the lawyer is involved, and the majority view thus prohibits it. Although we find 
that the funds advanced by respondent may have been made in part because of the long-standing personal relationship 
between respondent and his client, we nevertheless find that the loans here violated Rule 1.8(e).”) (internal citations 
omitted); Curtis v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 959 S.W.2d 94, 95-96 (Ky. 1998) (suspending for sixty days an attorney who gave 
financial assistance to clients in connection with pending or contemplated litigation and committed other violations). 
122  The majority rule is that 1.8(e) does not permit lawyers to make humanitarian loans to their clients even 
after the lawyer has been retained, but the punishment is rarely more than censure or reprimand. See, e.g., State ex rel. 
Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456, 457, 462-63 (Okla. 2000) (upholding a sixty-day suspension for attorney who 
loaned money to client for travel expenses as a violation of 1.8(e) and upholding the constitutionality of the prohibition on 
lending money to clients); In re Arensberg, 553 N.Y.S.2d 859, 859 (1990) (censuring two attorneys for making loans to 
clients after having been previously warned about this type of conduct); Ligon v. Rees, 364 S.W.3d 28, 39-42 (Ark. 2010) 
(applying a one year suspension and $676.60 fine for violations including of Rule 1.8(e)); Att’y Grievance Comm’n of 
Md. v. Pennington, 733 A.2d 1029, 1038 (Md. 1999) (holding the appropriate sanction for violation of 1.8(e) with no prior 
discipline to be a reprimand). But see Disciplinary Counsel v. Ranke, 956 N.E.2d 288, 290-92 (Ohio 2011) (holding the 
lawyer would receive an indefinite suspension for violations including of rule 1.8(e)). Disqualifications for violations of 
Rule 1.8(e) are generally not appropriate. But see Waldman v. Waldman, 499 N.Y.S.2d 184, 184 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) 
(holding disqualification could be appropriate even when attorney’s loan to client for automobile insurance premiums was 
motivated only by the “attorney’s genuine concern for his client’s financial plight”). Courts weigh the lawyer’s intent for 
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generally reluctant to disqualify lawyers from further representation if there is no pattern of 
offending conduct and financial assistance did not impact the representation.
123
 Courts have 
imposed discipline for violations even where an offer of financial help is intended to satisfy 
“humanitarian needs,”
124
 enable a client to pay an electric bill,
125
 provide bus tokens for a client’s 
travel to medical appointments,
126
 or cover living expenses under difficult circumstances.
127
 The 
irony of this absolute rule, which has not been lost upon some courts, is that advancing money to 
a client for living expenses or other dire needs is prohibited on the basis that it threatens the 
independence or judgment of the lawyer, but a lawyer’s advancement of even larger sums needed 
to cover litigation expenses is authorized.
128
 
Historically, it was not uncommon for lawyers to lend money to poor clients and this 
practice was not regarded as illegal or against public policy.
129
 Indeed, some courts deemed a 
                                                                
humanitarian aid of the client against the penalties given. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. McGill, 597 N.E.2d 1104, 1106 (Ohio 
1992) (finding that “guaranteeing financial assistance to clients while representing them in connection with contemplated 
or pending litigation” is bared by DR 5-103(B) and warrants public reprimand, even if the provision merits “re-
examin[ation]”). The ban on extending living expenses includes not only loans but also gifts, housing, and other forms of 
non-litigation based financial assistance. See In re Hoffmeyer, 656 S.E.2d 376, 378 (S.C. 2008) (“Rule 1.8(e) prohibits a 
lawyer from providing ‘financial assistance in connection with pending or completed litigation’ . . . . The rule does not 
distinguish between loans and gifts, and the term ‘financial assistance’ is unambiguous and encompasses both loans and 
gifts of money.”); Gex v. Miss. Bar, 656 So. 2d 1124, 1130 (Miss. 1995) (finding that providing financial assistance and 
housing while awaiting a delay in settlement violated rule 1.8(e)). But see Shade v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 72 F. 
Supp. 2d 518, 520-22 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding an attorney who provided plaintiff free use of apartment and paid family 
related expenses because plaintiff had lost his job, suffered an emotional breakdown, and plaintiff’s wife was injured did 
not warrant a disqualification because the client would not be required to repay the law firm so there was a low risk of 
conflict of interest). 
123  See Hernandez v. Guglielmo, 796 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1291 (D. Nev. 2011) (noting that most penalties for 
violation of Rule 1.8(e) are modest and holding that the disqualification of counsel for violation of the rule is “not 
appropriate unless there is evidence of a pattern of such violations, the loan actually impacted the attorney’s handling of 
the case, or other misconduct was present.”). 
124  See In re Ballew, 695 S.E.2d 573, 576 (Ga. 2010) (“[T]he State Bar rejects Ballew’s assertion that his 
decision to give the client money for ‘humanitarian needs’ obviated his obligation to comply with the Bar Rules regarding 
his trust fund and accounting requirements.”); Miss. Bar v. Shaw, 919 So. 2d 51, 55-56 (Miss. 2005) (disciplining for 
“humanitarian” aid due to policy concerns about competition between lawyers). 
125  See In re Strait, 540 S.E.2d 460, 462 (S.C. 2000) (finding that “advanc[ing] money to a client in order 
for her to pay her electric bill” was a violation of Rule 1.8(e)). 
126  See Rubenstein v. Statewide Grievance Comm., No. CV020516965S, 2003 WL 21499265, at *9 n.14, 
*11 (Conn. Super. Ct. June 10, 2003) (upholding the Grievance Committee’s public reprimands against two attorneys who 
made loans for bus tokens for travel to the doctor and for medical expenses). 
127  See, e.g., In re Minor Child K.A.H., 967 P.2d 91, 93-97 (Alaska 1998) (holding that the state’s version 
of Rule 1.8(e) precludes an attorney “from making loans for living expenses to a client after the attorney has been 
retained.”). 
128  See Miss. Bar v. Att’y HH, 671 So. 2d 1293, 1298 (Miss. 1995) (“We are sensitive to the concern over 
leveling the playing field for injured parties. We also recognize the logical inconsistency of asserting that a lawyer’s 
interest in recovering moneys lent to a client for living and medical expenses would affect his judgment while the prospect 
of losing possibly vast sums advanced in the form of litigation expenses would not. . . . We invite the bench, bar and 
public to suggest a mechanism for dealing with the problem of the impecunious civil litigant with a viable and valuable 
claim. In the meantime we enforce our standards of conduct as written.”). 
129  See Shapley v. Bellows, 4 N.H. 347, 355 (1828) (“And it is not uncommon that attornies [sic] commence 
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lawyer’s offer of financial help to be appropriate and necessary so that an indigent client would 
not be forced to accept an inadequate settlement simply because of poverty.
130
 The Model Rules 
have strayed far from this noble proposition. 
Even if a prohibition on extending financial assistance holds merit in the traditional 
lawyering model, it is questionable, at best, when applied to the delivery of free legal services to 
indigent clients. The assumptions that underlie this prohibition simply do not apply when 
providing free legal assistance to impoverished communities. There is no real concern that 
lawyers will overreach to obtain clients and in many types of cases involving the poor, such as 
landlord-tenant evictions or mortgage foreclosures, there is no sizeable monetary recovery that 
would give substance to ethical concerns. 
Poverty presents special ethical and moral challenges for lawyers serving the poor. What 
should a lawyer do if an indigent client is unable to preserve important legal defenses or protect 
basic human needs in the courts without short-term financial assistance from the lawyer? Should a 
humanitarian act of kindness from a lawyer to an indigent client in this dire setting be deemed an 
act of professional misconduct? 
To explore these concerns, consider the plight of an indigent tenant defending against an 
eviction action brought by her landlord for non-payment of rent.
131
 Due to the scarcity of legal 
help, the tenant proceeds on her own in a housing court where the landlord is likely to be 
represented by counsel. Although the tenant may have a meritorious warranty of habitability 
defense based upon deplorable housing conditions, the tenant may not be aware of those defenses 
and may not know how to present relevant information to the court without legal help. If a 
judgment for possession is awarded to the landlord, the tenant will be advised of her right to 
appeal to a higher court of general jurisdiction for a hearing de novo. But, to appeal and receive a 
“supersedeas,” or a stay of the eviction, so that she may stay in her home while awaiting her day 
in court, the tenant will be required to post a bond or pay an amount equal to the lesser of three 
months of rent or the amount of rent actually in arrears on the date of the filing of the appeal.
132
 
If the tenant again seeks legal help again from her local legal aid organization, she may 
obtain help because the consequences are so dire. Without further court review, the tenant and her 
                                                                
actions for poor people and make advances of money necessary to the prosecution of the suit upon the credit of the cause. 
Thus a person in indigent circumstances is enabled to obtain justice in cases where, without such aid, he would be unable 
to enforce a just claim.”); see also Johnson v. Great N. Ry. Co., 128 Minn. 365, 369 (Minn. 1915) (“But is it champerty or 
maintenance or against public policy for an attorney to solicit business, to pay money to a poor client for his living 
expenses during the litigation, or to advise him against a settlement of his case? . . . [W]e are aware of no authority holding 
that it is against public policy [to advance money to the injured client.]”); People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. McCallum, 173 
N.E. 827, 831 (Ill. 1930) (stating an attorney does not violate ethics laws or offend public policy by lending money to an 
indigent client for living and medical expenses while case is pending). 
130  See In re Teichner, 387 N.E.2d 265, 272 (Ill. 1979) (noting that “offer of financial assistance” by lawyer 
was not “necessarily improper” and that “[t]his court long ago rejected any rule which would permit indigent plaintiffs to 
be forced into a hasty, inadequate settlement by their indigency.”); see also Dupuis v. Faulk, 609 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (La. 
Ct. App., 1992) (“Nor do we see how a lawyer’s guarantee of necessary medical treatment for his client, even for a non-
litigation related illness, can be regarded as unethical, if the lawyer for reasons of humanity can afford to do so.”); Att’y 
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Harris, 528 A.2d 895, 903 (Md. 1987) (stating that advances against anticipated settlement 
of tort claims were acceptable). 
131  The following example is based upon a common factual situation arising in Philadelphia under the rules 
and procedures of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. 
132  See PHILA. CIV. R. 1008(b)-(c). 
26
University of Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Social Change, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol17/iss4/1
RULLI_ROADBLOCKS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE_FORMATTED_SS EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/20/2014  10:30 PM 
2014] ROADBLOCKS TO ACCESS TO JUSTICE 373 
children will face homelessness. But, to perfect her appeal and stay of eviction proceedings, the 
tenant must now pay an amount (or post the required bond), which is beyond her current financial 
means. Is a court-required bond a litigation expense that a legal aid lawyer may pay, in order to 
ensure that the tenant has an opportunity to be heard represented by counsel in a formal court? Or, 
will a lawyer regard payment of the bond for this rental expense as outside the boundaries of 
permissible court costs?
133
 
Assume, further, that court rules require the tenant to also pay monthly rent as it becomes 
due, but that the tenant experiences a disruption in her disability benefits due to no fault of her 
own. The legal aid lawyer agrees to also represent the tenant to restore her disability benefits but 
this process will take time, perhaps two or more months, before the client’s public benefits can be 
restored. May a lawyer provide financial assistance to the client for rental payments as they 
become due while awaiting the restoration of disability benefits so that the landlord-tenant case 
may proceed and the tenant’s family can remain in their home pending a court determination? Or, 
must the lawyer stand idly by as the tenant and her family are evicted because monthly rent 
cannot be posted with the court due to the administrative error of the disability agency? 
Let’s consider one additional example. A low-income homeowner who is delinquent on 
real estate tax payments to her local municipality faces legal proceedings to schedule her home 
for a sheriff’s sale to collect the delinquency. Local law permits the homeowner to enter into a 
repayment agreement and, as long as she stays current with the terms of the agreement, to avoid 
loss of her home. With the assistance of her pro bono lawyer, the homeowner enters into a 
payment agreement that sets the terms of monthly payments under local law to stop the sheriff’s 
sale of her home, but the agreement will not go into effect unless the first payment of less than 
one-hundred dollars is received within thirty days. The low-income homeowner has already spent 
her modest monthly income on other necessities, and cannot get help from family members to 
tender this additional payment within thirty days. May the homeowner’s lawyer advance this 
modest sum so that the agreement goes into effect, the client’s home is not sold at sheriff’s sale, 
and the client has needed time to budget in the future for this additional expense? 
It is in emergency situations such as these that wealthier clients can draw upon a safety 
net in savings or family resources, so that their legal claims are not lost. Low-income individuals 
have far fewer options, and often turn to their public interest lawyers for whatever assistance can 
be obtained. In this setting, does it make sense to have an ethical rule that prohibits a non-profit 
lawyer from advancing financial assistance that will prevent the homelessness of a client, 
especially when the same rules permit a lawyer to advance even larger sums to pay the lodging 
expenses of an out-of-state client to attend a deposition?
134
 
Some states have forged different responses to this problem. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court, for example, declined to find an ethical violation where a lawyer extended financial 
assistance solely for “minor sums” to cover minimal living expenses, to prevent foreclosure, or to 
                                                                
133  See Pa. Bar Ass’n. Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof’l Resp., Informal Op. 2000-14, at *2 (2000) 
(available on WestLaw, 2000 WL 1616267) (finding that it is ethically permissible for lawyer with an indigent client to 
post bond for the lesser of three months of rent or the amount of the judgment, but not to pay for living costs, because “the 
posting of the bond is much more akin to court costs and litigation expenses” than “it is to ‘financial assistance’ prohibited 
by [Rule 1.8(e)]”).  
134  See Conn. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 00-21, at *1 (2000) (available on WestLaw, 
2000 WL 33170670) (stating that the litigation costs that a lawyer may pay include the travel and lodging expenses for an 
out-of-state client to attend a deposition, despite a 1990 opinion that a lawyer may not advance $300 in rent to prevent 
homelessness, even to continue a case that would likely “yield considerably more than $300”).  
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obtain “necessary medical treatment.”
135
 There, the Court stated that no “bar disciplinary rule can 
or should contemplate depriving poor people from access to the court so as effectively to assert 
their claim.”
136
 Louisiana has adopted an ethical rule that permits the advancement of funds to 
clients for minimal, necessary living expenses, under appropriate circumstances.
137
 Indeed, some 
have questioned whether a ban on humanitarian, non-interest-bearing loans by lawyers violates 
constitutional guarantees.
138
 
Other states have also departed from the approach taken by the Model Rules. Alabama, 
for example, allows “emergency” financial assistance by lawyers, provided repayment is not 
contingent on the outcome of the matter and that the lawyer does not promise financial assistance 
before being hired.
139
 Under Alabama’s rule, “[t]he lawyer is never obligated to provide such 
assistance, [but the lawyer] is obligated to attempt collection from the client regardless of the 
outcome of the matter.”
140
 Minnesota permits a lawyer to “guarantee a loan reasonably needed to 
enable the client to withstand delay in litigation that would otherwise put substantial pressure on 
the client to settle [the] case because of financial hardship rather than on the merits . . . .”
141
 
Mississippi allows advancement of medical expenses and living expenses “under dire and 
necessitous circumstances . . . limited to minimal living expenses of minor sums such as those 
necessary to prevent foreclosure or repossession or for necessary medical treatment.”
142
 
                                                                
135  La. State Bar Ass’n v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 445-46 (La. 1976) (finding that there is no violation for a 
lawyer already retained by a client who only forwarded small amounts and for which the client remains ultimately liable, 
and the attorney “did not encourage public knowledge of this practice” to recruit clients).  
136  Id. at 446.  
137  See LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(4) (2006) (permitting a lawyer to “provide financial 
assistance to a client who is in necessitous circumstances, subject to . . . restrictions” such as extending only minimum 
financial assistance and that it not serve as “an inducement”); see also In re Maxwell, 783 So. 2d 1244, 1249 (La. 2001) 
(noting that advancing “minimal, necessary living expenses” is acceptable and calling for a committee to amend Louisiana 
Rule 1.8). 
138  See, e.g., Dupuis v. Faulk, 609 So. 2d 1190, 1193 (La. App. Ct. 1992) (noting that the “court-adopted 
bar disciplinary rule which places an unreasonable burden upon an individual’s right to enforce claims” may violate the 
guarantee of access to courts under the state constitution); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Carpenter, 863 P.2d 1123, 
1132 (Okla. 1993) (Kauger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Overreaching for pecuniary gain by an attorney 
should be vigorously investigated and discipline imposed if warranted. However, the provision of humanitarian, non-
interest bearing loans to clients does not warrant discipline. Rule 1.8(e), of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 
prohibiting such loans, violates both the Oklahoma and the United States Constitutions.”) (footnotes omitted). But see 
Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Smolen, 17 P.3d 456, 463 (Okla. 2000) (rejecting the claim that Rule 1.8(e) violates 
the federal equal protection guaranty). 
139  ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2009). The ABA has provided detailed treatment of 
model rules and modifications adopted by the states. See ABA CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., VARIATIONS OF 
THE ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: RULE 1.8 (2013) available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/mrpc_1_8.authcheckdam.pdf (cataloging differences in the 
promulgation of Rule 1.8 between states). 
140  ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. (2009). 
141  MINN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2011). 
142  MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1999). In the wake of disaster relief following Hurricane 
Katrina, Mississippi relaxed its ethical rules and permitted a $2,500 cap that a lawyer could advance in living expenses and 
medical treatment but that must be reported within seven days and would need to be repaid upon successful conclusion of 
the matter. In re Rules of Professional Conduct, No. 89-R-99018-SCT (Miss. Oct. 3, 2005), available at 
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In short, several states have departed from the Model Rules’ approach and permit a 
lawyer to advance living expenses or other financial assistance under real hardship circumstances 
that adversely affect the client’s ability to maintain a claim or defense in court. The rules vary in 
their requirements, but generally limit financial assistance to basic human needs, such as shelter, 
utilities, or emergency medical expenses. Lawyers may not promise assistance as a means of 
obtaining a client and may not extend financial assistance prior to being retained.
143
 
A different approach to this problem is to fashion a special rule only for approved 
providers of free legal assistance, such as legal aid offices, law school clinical programs, and 
approved pro bono organizations. New Jersey has adopted this approach.
144
 New Jersey’s ethical 
rules permit approved provider organizations or lawyers rendering qualifying pro bono services to 
provide financial assistance to indigent clients whom they are representing for free.
145
 
The time has come to revisit the Model Rules’ financial assistance prohibitions that 
unnecessarily restrict lawyers for the poor from being able to safeguard the claims of their clients 
and to ensure access to the courts under dire circumstances. There are at least two approaches 
deserving of serious consideration. The first approach, adopted by Louisiana, is a broad-based 
rule applicable to all licensed lawyers that permits financial assistance when assisting clients who 
experience dire circumstances that threaten access to the court and where modest assistance is 
needed to meet emergency needs, such as shelter, utilities, or health. Safeguards can be imposed 
in such a rule to protect against overreaching and to minimize conflict of interest concerns. 
A second approach, adopted by New Jersey, is to craft a special rule for recognized 
providers of legal services to the poor that relaxes restrictions on financial assistance when such 
assistance is provided in the course of delivering free legal services to indigent clients. New 
Jersey’s approach is similar to that adopted by Model Rule 6.5, which relaxes conflict rules for 
lawyers serving the poor in special projects sponsored by the courts or legal aid providers.
146
 In 
this limited universe, a special rule such as New Jersey’s largely eliminates the risks associated 
with extending financial assistance to clients and represents valuable progress in promoting access 
to the courts. 
 
                                                                
http://courts.ms.gov/rules/ruleamendments/2005/sn127102.pdf; MISS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (1999). 
143  See, e.g., LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(4) (2006) (restricting loans to a client, outside 
litigation expenses, to those necessary due to a client having financial “circumstances” that would “adversely affect the 
client’s ability to initiate and/or maintain the cause,” those that provide only “minimum . . . necessary” living 
requirements, and those that do not induce the client to employ the lawyer). 
144  See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(3) (2004) (“[A] non-profit organization . . . may 
provide financial assistance to indigent clients whom it is representing without fee.”).  
145  N.J. Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.8(e) (2004). In 2012, the New Jersey Bar Association proposed an 
update to its Rule 1.8(e) in order to clarify and expand the number of groups able to provide financial aid to clients. See 
EMILY GOLDBERG & KAREN SACKS, N.J. STATE BAR ASS’N PRO BONO TASK FORCE, CLOSING THE JUSTICE GAP 58 
(2012) (proposing altering the rules to allow “a legal services or public interest organization, a law school clinical or pro 
bono program, or an attorney providing qualified pro bono service as defined in R. 1:21-XX(a)” to provide financial 
assistance those “clients whom the organization, program, or attorney is representing without fee.”). 
146  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013). 
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III. WITHDRAWAL OF REPRESENTATION 
The justice gap is severe in almost all trial courts, but is perhaps most dire in family 
courts where the overwhelming number of litigants are unrepresented in critical matters affecting 
the best interests of their children. Family court judges are called upon to make incredibly 
important decisions that hold long-term consequences for the well-being of families without 
having the benefit of carefully marshaled facts or legal arguments provided by knowledgeable 
attorneys. Legal aid programs are stretched far beyond their limited resources in family courts and 
nowhere is the need greater for pro bono legal assistance.
147
 
At the same time, pro bono programs routinely report that it is difficult to secure 
volunteer lawyers in child custody cases.
148
 While personal rewards from helping children obtain 
stability and gain prosperity through family court proceedings are great, many lawyers avoid 
volunteering for child custody cases. The reasons are many, but one important factor is the real 
concern that a lawyer’s offer of representation in one discrete family court hearing will obligate 
the lawyer to months or years of continuing pro bono service, extending beyond the lawyer’s 
available time or resources.
149
 Lawyers are acutely aware that volunteering for one child custody 
hearing may require their continued assistance in prolonged, subsequent custody modifications 
and enforcement disputes that frequently drag on for years, sometimes only ending when the child 
turns eighteen years of age. 
The American Bar Association’s Standing Committee on Pro Bono and Public Service 
has studied factors that discourage pro bono service. In a report published in 2013, the ABA 
committee found that fifty-nine percent of lawyers polled believed that greater opportunities to 
provide limited scope representation would encourage lawyers to do more pro bono.
150
 Lawyers 
who were surveyed identified time constraints as a top factor discouraging greater pro bono 
services.
151
 The ABA report found that more lawyers would volunteer their services to the poor if 
they could be assured that their service was not open-ended and could be reasonably limited in 
ways that would still provide a valuable service.
152
 
Instead of addressing this recurring input from lawyers, the Model Rules retain onerous 
requirements for withdrawal of representation once a lawyer’s entry of appearance is entered and 
fail to create relaxed rules for short-term, limited representation. As a result, many lawyers are 
                                                                
147  See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 55, at 15, 18-19. 
148  See ABA STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO & PUBLIC SERV. & ABA FAMILY LAW SECTION, 
ENHANCING THE REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN IN CUSTODY CASES: RESOURCE AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE 
ABA CHILD CUSTODY AND ADOPTION PRO BONO PROJECT 2001-2008, at 24 (2008). 
149  See Michele N. Struffolino, Taking Limited Representation to the Limits: The Efficacy of Using 
Unbundled Legal Services in Domestic-Relations Matters Involving Litigation, 2 St. Mary’s J. on Legal Malpractice & 
Ethics 166, 260 (2012) (“The unique legal and emotional challenges involved in domestic-relations cases requiring more 
than perfunctory court involvement make it almost impossible for the attorney to conclude that offering some 
representation, leaving the litigant pro se status for aspects of the case, is reasonable.”). 
150  BUCZEK ET AL., supra note 52, at vii-viii (detailing factors that lawyers believed would encourage or 
discourage pro bono service). 
151  Id. at viii. 
152  See id. at 26 (“Attorneys surveyed were asked to rate how influential they believed specific statements 
about actions referral organizations could take to encourage pro bono were. [Fifty-nine percent] of attorneys believed that 
providing limited scope representation opportunities was highly influential.”).  
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reluctant to appear in court solely to argue a motion or to provide limited representation in a 
specific one-day hearing, for fear of obligating themselves for continuing responsibility beyond 
that originally intended. Judges are understandably reluctant to allow lawyers to withdraw their 
appearances when they know that to do so will leave an unrepresented litigant with little hope of 
obtaining new counsel. 
It is apparent that more lawyers would be willing to lend their assistance for family court 
hearings if they could be assured that their voluntary service would conclude at the end of the day 
or at the end of a particular event or stage of the proceedings. But such an assurance, even if 
consented to by an indigent client, is subject to ethical constraints and court rules that make 
withdrawal of a lawyer’s representation difficult and uncertain.
153
 
Generally, lawyers may not withdraw their representation from a court case without 
simultaneously entering the appearance of a new counsel or securing the consent of the tribunal. 
The fact that a volunteer lawyer does not wish to continue beyond a point mutually agreed upon 
between the lawyer and client is not sufficient reason under model ethical rules to assure that the 
lawyer will be permitted to withdraw. Model Rule 1.16(c) provides that where a lawyer has 
entered an appearance on behalf of a client and the rules of the tribunal require approval of the 
withdrawal by the tribunal, the lawyer shall continue to provide representation even though there 
is good cause for terminating the representation.
154
 As a general matter, courts look to several 
factors when deciding whether to approve a lawyer’s withdrawal of representation, such as 
whether there is a simultaneous entry of appearance of successor counsel, motions are 
outstanding, or a trial date been set.
155
 A “decision whether to allow” a lawyer’s proposed 
withdrawal of representation lies within “the sound discretion” of the court and will not be altered 
on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
156
 
As a result, a lawyer cannot be assured that withdrawal will be permitted simply because 
the lawyer and client agree to limit the extent of a lawyer’s pro bono service. Indeed , many 
judges may consider themselves duty-bound to deny withdrawal despite client consent if it is 
likely to adversely affect the client’s interests. When a client has the resources to hire new 
counsel, or possesses the education, training, or sophistication to self-represent effectively, 
adverse consequences are not generally present. But, when a client is indigent, lacks basic 
understanding of legal matters, and has nowhere else to turn for legal help, the withdrawal of 
representation by a volunteer lawyer will almost always have a material adverse effect on the 
client’s interests. Under this standard, courts are entitled to routinely deny withdrawals by 
volunteer lawyers, and lawyers have little recourse.
157
 
                                                                
153  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2013) (providing the rules guiding declining or 
terminating representation). 
154  Id.; see also, e.g., In re Kiley, 947 N.E.2d 1, 4-5 (Mass. 2011) (noting that the tribunal’s approval itself 
may be required before a lawyer may withdraw). 
155  See, e.g., In re Kiley, 947 N.E.2d at 5. 
156  Id. 
157  A New Jersey court denied a lawyer’s motion to withdraw when it viewed the client as being 
significantly disadvantaged if forced to proceed pro se due to the extensive factual and procedural history and substantial 
discovery required as well as the likelihood of not being able to retain new counsel or new counsel not being able to 
become familiar with the case in a timely manner. See Cuadra v. Univision Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-4946 (JLL), 2012 WL 
1150833, at *9 (D.N.J. 2012) (“Even if counsel had provided good cause to withdraw, the other factors weigh against 
granting this motion. The prejudice that withdrawal would cause to the parties, the harm to the administration of justice, 
and delay of resolution of this case all demonstrate that the Court should exercise its discretion [to continue 
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While courts have long permitted lawyers to withdraw representation when a client fails 
to pay the fees of the lawyer, they are less willing to permit a volunteer lawyer to withdraw 
representation of an indigent client because of the additional burdens that such withdrawal places 
upon the courts and the client.
158
 As a result, cases that are likely to involve multiple or recurring 
hearings or which will last for long periods of time, such as child custody disputes, are less likely 
to attract pro bono legal assistance even though the stakes in such cases are high and legal help is 
so vital to a proper determination. 
This is certainly not a new development. Nonetheless, the Model Rules remain silent in 
the face of this important concern.
159
 Model Rule 6.5 fails to address this issue in the context of 
short-term assistance in innovative projects, even though modifications would likely promote 
greater pro bono assistance in our family courts.
160
 In the void left by the Model Rules, some 
states are beginning to develop new approaches. 
New Hampshire, for example, has endorsed limited entries of representation to 
encourage greater short-term legal assistance and has added an additional paragraph to its ethics 
Rule 1.16, which provides for automatic termination of representation: 
(e) The representation of a lawyer having entered a limited appearance as 
authorized by the tribunal under a limited representation agreement under Rule 
1.2(f)(1), shall terminate upon completion of the agreed representation, without 
the necessity of leave of court, upon providing notice of completion of the 
limited representation to the court.
161
 
Under this rule, lawyers are more likely to volunteer because they are ensured that their 
service will be limited to the specific matters or events, which were agreed upon with their clients. 
Similarly, California has adopted a specific rule that provides for limited entries of appearance 
and that establishes a streamlined procedure for being relieved as the attorney of record upon 
completion of tasks specified in the notice of limited scope representation.
162
 
Innovations such as these signal the importance of responding to the concerns of lawyers 
who want to volunteer but also want to limit their service within reasonable boundaries upon 
which they may confidently rely. The Model Rules should play a valuable role in recommending 
thoughtful responses to this problem for states to consider. While ethical rules relaxing constraints 
on withdrawal of representation in these special settings will not preempt specific court rules 
governing this practice, ethical rules are likely to be persuasive in encouraging courts to take into 
                                                                
representation]”); see also Gerold v. Vehling, 89 A.3d 767, 771 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (“[T]he question of whether an 
attorney should be permitted to withdraw an appearance is within the discretion of the trial court . . . .”). 
158  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(5) (2013) (noting that the lawyer may withdraw 
when “the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer’s services and has been given 
reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled”). 
159  Neither Model Rule 1.2 governing limited scope representation nor Model Rule 1.16 governing 
withdrawal of representation speaks to this question. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2013); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2013). 
160  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013). 
161  N.H. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16(e) (2013). 
162  CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 3.36 (2006) (providing the new California procedure governing limited scope 
appearances by attorneys).  
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account access to justice needs when crafting local rules governing the withdrawal of free legal 
representation to the poor. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Our challenge is to ensure equal justice under law in every courtroom.
163
 Some believe 
that poverty will always be with us and that ethical rules should not attempt to address this 
problem.
164
 To the contrary, this Article asserts that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
have the ability to play a very important role in shaping needed change among the states to 
achieve access to justice. Although the organized bar has been a staunch advocate for expanding 
access to lawyers, it has acted too slowly in adapting the Model Rules to the special needs of low-
income individuals who are directly affected by the nation’s justice gap. The Model Rules 
continue to be largely situated in a traditional lawyering paradigm which has grown increasingly 
distant from how legal services are actually delivered to the poor. Ethical rules must adjust more 
quickly to the realities of a delivery system that unbundles its services in diverse settings and 
attempts triage under very difficult circumstances. 
To make meaningful progress against the justice gap, we must step up our efforts to 
boost public funding for civil legal assistance while also advocating for a right to counsel when 
basic human needs are at stake. We must also undertake bold innovations in the manner and 
places in which we provide legal help to the poor. This means expanding limited scope 
representation and unbundled legal services in nontraditional settings and adopting new measures 
to assist unrepresented individuals. Low-income individuals who cannot obtain full representation 
are turning to limited assistance when it is available from help desks, telephone hotlines, 
community fairs, and advice-only clinics. Ethical constraints that restrict the provision of legal 
services to the poor in these settings must be reexamined. The Model Rules should lift 
unnecessary restrictions and provide greater flexibility to lawyers who struggle to provide some 
measure of legal help in such demanding circumstances. 
This Article has highlighted three areas of the Model Rules to illustrate the need for 
comprehensive and modern reforms. In such areas as document assistance to unrepresented 
litigants, financial assistance to indigent clients, and withdrawal of representation in limited scope 
representation, the Model Rules’ approach of restrictions, silence, and ambiguity coalesce to 
impede access to justice. While occasional professional guidance opinions offer valuable help on 
a case-by-case basis, the time has come for a comprehensive review of the Model Rules from the 
perspective of providing greater legal assistance to those who have so little access to our civil 
justice system. The surprisingly few changes in the Model Rules over the past fifteen years 
directed at promoting access to justice are simply not enough to constitute a meaningful response 
to the challenges that confront our legal system in a justice gap crisis. 
This Article proposes that the ABA appoint a blue ribbon commission to conduct a 
comprehensive and systematic review of the entire Model Rules from an access to justice 
perspective. The commission should include leaders of the judiciary and legal aid and pro bono 
                                                                
163  See generally Randall T. Shepard, The Self-Represented Litigant: Implications for the Bench and Bar, 
48 FAM. CT. REV. 607 (2010) (exploring the challenge of providing equal access to justice when self-representation is 
increasing). 
164  See Wendy Watrous, Lawyer or Loan Shark? Rule 1.8(E) of Louisiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct 
Blurs the Line, 48 LOY. L. REV. 117, 142 (2002) (stating that the rules of professional conduct “cannot and should not” 
help solve poverty and should instead “focus first and foremost” on regulating lawyers). 
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communities so that it will have a deep and practical understanding of how legal services are 
increasingly delivered to the poor. The commission’s review should be heavily influenced by the 
well-intended motivations of non-profit lawyers trying under difficult circumstances to expand 
this country’s delivery of civil legal assistance in non-traditional settings, often at high speed and 
to large audiences. The three areas of the Model Rules discussed in this Article are offered to 
highlight some of the ways in which ethical constraints grounded in a traditional, profit-
motivated, lawyering paradigm do not serve the needs of indigent clients. 
There is much work for such a newly-constituted commission. Many areas of our ethical 
rules require revisions or additions in light of a rapidly changing legal environment affecting the 
poor. Since the appointment of the Ethics 2000 Commission, the Model Rules have been amended 
on roughly ten occasions, but relatively few adopted changes have related to access to justice 
concerns. These revisions have mostly addressed multijurisdictional practice, corporate 
responsibility, client protection, and technology and global practice developments.
165
 Even the 
Ethics 2000 Commission, which was charged with the responsibility to review the need to expand 
access to legal services for low and moderate income persons as part of a comprehensive review 
of the model rules, only produced three major changes relating to access to justice for the poor. 
Model Rule 5.4 (permitting the sharing of court-awarded fees with a non-profit organization),
166
 
Model Rule 6.1 (adding to the first sentence regarding a lawyer’s professional responsibility to 
provide legal service to those unable to pay),
167
 and Model Rule 6.5 (crafting a new rule relaxing 
conflict of interest and imputation rules in short-term, limited legal services delivered in non-
profit or court-sponsored projects)
168
 were welcome additions, but these changes simply do not go 
far enough in promoting access to justice. 
This Article suggests that there are many topics in the Model Rules that would benefit 
from comprehensive review viewed through an access to justice lens. In addition to those items 
already discussed in this Article, a blue-ribbon commission might want to revise anti-solicitation 
rules that have never applied well to the provision of free legal services to the poor.
169
 The Model 
Rules should affirmatively encourage, rather than hinder, the activities of lawyers designed to 
reach out to low-income communities to inform and advise residents and to sign up clients who 
need free legal help to protect their incomes, shelter, and safety. 
A high-level commission might also undertake a comprehensive (and overdue) review of 
the ethical dimensions of onerous congressional restrictions imposed upon lawyers in legal aid 
organizations that receive federal funds from the Legal Services Corporation (LSC). In 1996 
Congress enacted sweeping restrictions upon lawyering activities that legal aid lawyers may 
undertake with federal funds, and also barred lawyers from providing legal help to certain 
disfavored poverty populations, even with non-federal funds.
170
 As a result, legal aid lawyers are 
                                                                
165  See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
166  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013). 
167  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2013). 
168  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.5 (2013). 
169  See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013) (prohibiting certain methods of solicitation). 
170  Congress imposed a broad range of onerous restrictions on lawyers employed by LSC-funded programs 
which applied for the first time to activities undertaken with private or non-LSC government funds, as well as with LSC 
funds. These restrictions include limitations on class actions, lobbying and rule-making, attorney’s fees, in-person 
solicitation of clients, most welfare reform activities, and representation of disfavored populations. See Omnibus 
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-50 to 
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unable to help vulnerable individuals and families, such as prisoners, public housing tenants 
facing charges of criminal or drug activity, and non-U.S. citizens (with limited exceptions), even 
when private or other public funds are available to do so. 
Model Rule 5.4, which is intended to protect the professional independence of lawyers, 
prohibits a lawyer from permitting a person who employs or pays the lawyer to render legal 
services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering legal 
services to a client.
171
 After almost twenty years of such congressional restrictions on lawyers for 
the poor, hasn’t the time finally arrived for the legal profession to speak through its Model Rules 
to the ethical dimensions of such heavy-handed and harmful governmental intrusion into the 
attorney-client relationship? 
We should agree that there is no substitute for full representation when a lawyer is 
needed to protect a client’s vital interests. This is as true for the poor as it is for the rich. But, as 
we struggle to expand access to justice, the Model Rules should do much more to reflect the 
realities of our civil legal assistance delivery system and to remove obstacles transported from a 
traditional lawyering paradigm that needlessly hinder lawyers for the poor. 
The Model Rules may not solve the justice gap, but they should no longer be part of the 
problem. 
 
                                                                
1321-56 (1996). Congress removed the 1996 restriction on attorney’s fees in fiscal year 2010. See Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034, 3148-57 (2009) (extending the general restrictions on LSC 
funding and then, in § 533, specifically “striking paragraph (13)” of § 504(a)).  
171  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2013). 
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